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Comment
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRADITIONAL RULEMAKING
PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF NEGOTIATION IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, increasing attention has been paid to the forms
and functions of administrative agencies in the United States.' What began
as a new assertion of governmental power in the late nineteenth century2 is
now described as the "fourth branch" of the American government.
3
Administrative agencies perform a variety of functions in modern soci-
ety; as a group, these functions defy generalization. 4 However, one type of
agency action which can be identified is rulemaking. 5 The focus of this com-
ment will be limited to a critical analysis of a theory which suggests regula-
1. See generall y E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM
OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982) (significant economic costs and other
less tangible costs are symptoms of current state of regulatory unreasonableness);
Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform,
92 HARV. L. REV. 547 (1979) (inherent problems in present regulatory system render
it inherently ill-designed to meet its objectives); Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (traditional model of administra-
tive law has disintegrated and current responses to the disintegration fail as structures
for legitimating agency action).
2. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 8; Stewart, supra note 1, at
1671. The challenge of administrative law during the nineteenth century was to
"reconcile the new . . . governmental power with a long-standing solicitude for pri-
vate liberties by means of controls that served both to limit and legitimate such
power." Stewart, supra note 1, at 1671-72.
3. See Volner, Getting the Horse Before the Cart. Identiiing the Causes of Failure of the
Regulatory Commissions, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 285, 287 (1977). "As a fourth branch [of
government], the independent [regulatory] commissions perform an amalgam of
functions of the other three [branches]." Id. (citing FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S.
470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
4. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1670-71 n.5. There are "significant differences in
administrative functions, agency forms, and the sources and operative foci of various
administrative law doctrines" which render all attempts at generalization about ad-
ministrative agencies perilous. Id.
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (rulemaking provisions of Administrative Procedure
Act). Rules have been described as "[r]egulatory standards that apply uniformly to a
broad category of activities, processes, or products . . . ." Stewart, Regulation, Innova-
tion, and Admnistrative Law. A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1273-74
(1981).
The other major type of agency action is adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6),
(7), 554 (1982) (adjudication is the process by which agencies formulate orders). Ad-
judications typically apply to "specific individuals" and "operate concretely" upon
those individuals. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 55 (1976).
For a discussion of the notice of proposed rulemaking which is required by
(1505)
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tory negotiation as a method of reform for agency rulemaking. 6
Administrative rulemaking procedures have been undergoing develop-
ment and change for a number of years. After examining the current
problems with agency rulemaking and their historical roots, this comment
will set forth and explain a recently proposed cure for some of these
problems: negotiated rulemaking. The development of one set of regula-
tions which involved substantial negotiation will be examined as a case study
of the viability and predictive accuracy of the negotiated rulemaking proce-
dure. 7 Finally, this comment will evaluate the viability of negotiated
rulemaking and suggest some modifications in the procedures to improve
this alternative form of administrative action.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE
To understand the proposed changes in the rulemaking process, it is
important to review briefly the history of American administrative agencies
and the procedures they have employed to develop rules.8 The early era of
American administrative law followed the advent of the industrial revolu-
tion, and was an attempt to "reconcile" claims of governmental authority
with private sector autonomy.9 This reconciliation was achieved by prohib-
iting official "intrusions on private liberty or property" except when the leg-
§ 553, see note 68 infra. For a discussion of the opportunity to participate which must
be offered in rulemaking proceedings pursuant to § 553, see note 56 in/ra.
6. The scope of this comment will not encompass agency adjudications in order
to permit a more detailed analysis of a recent proposal which advocated the use of
negotiated rulemaking. See generally Harter, Negotiating Regulations. A Cure for Malaise,
71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) (proposing a comprehensive agenda for the negotiation of
rules); Note, Rethinking Regulation.- Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (1981) (relaxed procedural rules for rulemaking leave
room for experimentation with new ideas). For a discussion of Mr. Harter's proposals
for the use of negotiated rulemaking, see notes 34-74 and accompanying text infra.
7. For a discussion of the Office of Federal Contracts Compliance Programs
(OFCCP) regulations which were developed through a process which included sub-
stantial negotiations between interested parties, see notes 75-115 and accompanying
text infra.
8. See generally Stewart, supra note I (comprehensive review of traditional model
of administrative law; explication of view that agencies were originally "transmission
belts" intended to fulfill specific legislative directives).
9. Id at 1669-70; Harter, supra note 6, at 8. Professor Stewart explained the
development of administrative law in post-Industrial Revolution America:
The direct control by state, and then federal, administrative officials of
rates, services, and other practices, first of railroads and then of a wide vari-
ety of other enterprises, grew so pervasive and intrusive that it could not be
justified by reference to past executive practices. Accordingly, a body of
* doctrines and techniques developed to reconcile the new assertions of gov-
ernmental power with a long-standing solicitude for private liberties by
means of controls that served both to limit and legitimate such power.
Stewart, supra note 1, at 1671-72.
In addition to the "explosion of modern regulatory ...programs" after the
Industrial Revolution, it is important to recognize that regulation of commercial
practices occurred in colonial America. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 8.
Just as regulation has a long history in America, those regulated have long resented
1506 [Vol. 29: p. 1505
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islature had authorized such intrusions.° Because so much of the regulatory
activity in this era was designed solely to transmit legislative directives to the
regulated public, the early administrative agencies have been described as
"transmission belt[s]."' As a corollary to the "transmission belt" theory,
administrative discretion was explicitly limited in the early regulatory
programs. 12
In contrast to the narrow roles played by the early regulatory agencies,
and been dissatisfied with the regulations affecting them. Id (citing E. FREUND,
STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 77 (1965)).
10. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1670. Examples of early regulatory intrusions were
the Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 57-223, 32 Stat. 632 (1902) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 16, 17, 301-470 (1982)) and the Meat Packing Act, Pub. L. No. 242,
34 Stat. 1256, 1260 (1907) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1982)). See
E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 8. The result of these statutes was govern-
mental inspection of meat processing plants and sampling of food products in search
of potential adulteration. Id.
The concern for safety manifested in the regulation of food production was also
demonstrated by the increased attention paid to workplace safety and health, rail-
road safety, and safe housing. Id at 8-9. See also Locomotive Inspection Act, Pub. L.
No. 61-383, 36 Stat. 913 (1911) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34 (1976))
(requiring railroads to establish self-inspection system for boilers and locomotive
parts using Interstate Commerce Commission inspectors).
11. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1675. Under the "transmission belt" theory, intru-
sion "into private liberties by agency officials not subject to electoral control" was
only permitted when "such intrusions. . .[were] commanded by a legitimate source
of authority-the legislature." Id.
The narrow role accorded to the "transmission belt" agencies reflected the late
19th century belief that the most effective protection "against dangerous products
and processes usually. . .[had] been the economic market and the incentives it cre-
ates." E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 9. An additional source of protec-
tion was liability law-employers and producers feared the damage awards and
adverse publicity which would occur unless steps were taken to improve safety. Id. at
10.
12. Harter, supra note 6, at 8. One reason for the lack of administrative discre-
tion was the absence of a constitutional grant of "inherent administrative powers
over persons and property." Stewart, supra note 1, at 1672. As a result, any control
which limited private conduct had to be "authorized by the legislature, and, under
the doctrine against delegation of legislative power, the legislature must promulgate
rules, standards, goals, or some 'intelligible principle' to guide the exercise of admin-
istrative power." Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 409 (1928)).
An example of the limits placed on the early regulatory programs was the "com-
paratively limited" mandate which empowered the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion to protect the public against unreasonable charges but failed to give the
Commission the authority to proscribe future rates. Id. at 1677 n.28 (citing I.L.
SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 11-35 (1931)); see Interstate
Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-
27 (1982)) (Interstate Commerce Commission established to protect general public
against unreasonable and discriminatory charges). Further illustrations of the lim-
ited mandate granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission were the narrow
amendments enacted by Congress when difficulties arose concerning the scope of the
Commission's powers and the "limiting construction" given to the amendments by
the courts. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1677 n.28 (citing Intermountain Rate Cases, 234
U.S. 476 (1914)).
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the agencies created as part of President Roosevelt's New Deal were granted
extensive powers to fulfill very general legislative directives.' 3 The operative
assumption behind these broad powers was that the agency staffs were "de-
tached, neutral, technocratic experts" who were capable of making the com-
plex decisions inherent in a regulatory program. 14 Despite the increased
discretion granted to agencies in the 1930's, critics disapproved of the broad
powers which, in their view, violated the doctrine of separation of powers.15
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)' 6 was enacted after pro-
tracted criticism of the administrative process.' 7 The APA was designed to
assist agency personnel in their exercise of discretion by requiring an "out-
reach . . . for information" and an opportunity for the public to make its
views known.' 8 For approximately two decades after the APA was passed,
courts applied its limitations as the sole method of checking agencies'
discretion. 19
13. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1677; Harter, supra note 6, at 8-9 (citing J. LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 66 (1938)) (broad and vague administrative stan-
dards typical of legislation in 1930's).
14. Harter, supra note 6, at 9; Stewart, supra note 1, at 1678. Those who favored
the unprecedented grant of power to the agencies argued that such action was neces-
sary in order to meet the economic crisis posed by the Depression. See Stewart, supra
note 1, at 1677 n.31 (citing J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10-16, 46-50
(1938)). Further, it was argued that broad "discretion was necessary if the agencies
were to discharge their planning and managerial functions successfully ...... Id. at
1677.
For a discussion of the shortcomings of the theory that administrative agencies
are experts who should be entrusted with vast discretion, see note 105 infra.
15. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1678-79 (citing McGuire, Federal Administrative Deci-
sions andJudcial Review Thereof or, Bureaucracy Under Control, 48 VA. STATE B.J. 301
(1936)). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.01, at 2 (1972) (first
stage in development of administrative law focused on constitutional underpinnings
of the administrative process, and emphasized separation of powers and the delega-
tion of power).
16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982). The APA governs practice and pro-
ceedings before federal administrative agencies. See K. DAVIS, supra note 15, § 1.04,
at 9-10. Professor Davis' text incorporates the various provisions of the APA in its
comprehensive discussion of administrative law. See generally 1d.
17. K. DAVIS, supra note 15, § 1.04, at 9-10. Professor Davis explained that criti-
cism of the administrative bureaucracy began in 1932 and was exacerbated through
the New Deal by the proliferation of new agencies until "antagonism toward bureau-
cracy . .. [approached] the breaking"point." Id. at 8. During the late 19 3 0's, the
American Bar Association and President Roosevelt both investigated the need for
procedural reform in administrative law. Id. Efforts to reform administrative law
were cut off during World War II, but in 1946 Congress unanimously passed the
APA. Id. at 9.
18. Harter, supra note 6, at 9. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1274. The APA was
initially perceived as an information-gathering procedure to aid the agencies in deci-
sionmaking, but this perception has changed during the last 38 years: "The [APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking] procedures were not originally conceived as adver-
sary mechanisms whereby outside parties could check agency power and lay the
groundwork for judicial review." Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the ad-
versarial "posturing" typically found in a modern rulemaking procedure, see note 41
infra.
19. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1678-81. Professor Stewart has identified threejudi-
(Vol. 29: p. 15051508
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In the late 1960's, however, the balance of power which had controlled
the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies was called into question.
In order to insure that technical issues were resolved more carefully and ac-
curately, reviewing courts began to require procedures to supplement those
procedures required by the APA.20 In addition, the courts began to apply
more stringent standards of review such as the "hard look" approach which
necessitated the development of an "extensive [administrative] record" prior
cial techniques which were employed to check agency discretion in the years after the
APA was enacted:
First, by undertaking a more searching scrutiny of the substantiality of
the evidence supporting agency factfinding and by insisting on a wider
range of procedural safeguards, the courts have . . . promoted more accu-
rate application of legislative directives. Additionally, more rigorous en-
forcement of procedural requirements, such as hearings, may have
influenced agencies' exercise of their discretion and may have served as a
partial substitute for political safeguards by, for example, facilitating input
from affected interests ....
A second technique . . . was the requirement of reasoned consistency
in agency decisionmaking. Under this doctrine, an agency might be re-
quired to articulate the reasons for reaching a choice in a given case even
though the loose texture of its legislative directive allowed a range of possi-
ble choices ...
Third, courts began to demand a clear statement of legislative purpose
as a means of restraining the range of agency choice when fundamental
individual liberties were at risk.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the requirement that substantial evidence
support agency factfinding, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951) (Congress intended that courts of appeals should determine whether there is
substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support agency findings). For an
example of the wider range of procedural safeguards upon which courts have insisted,
see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1950) (§ 5 of the APA covers
deportation hearings conducted by the Immigration Service despite absence of ex-
press requirement for hearings in Immigration Act). For a discussion of the require-
ment that agencies demonstrate reasoned consistency, see Hammond v. Lenfest, 398
F.2d 705, 715 (2d Cir. 1968) (a validly promulgated regulation binds the government
as much as the individuals subject to the regulation). But cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (agencies can choose between promulgation of rules or
case-by-case adjudication, and their determination that adjudication is appropriate is
entitled to great weight). For a discussion of the clear legislative purpose in cases
involving individual liberties, see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (if "lib-
erty" is to be regulated by a delegated power, the delegation must be narrow and
courts will construe all such powers narrowly).
20. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1274. Among the requirements judges began to
impose in the late 1960's were: disclosure requirements concerning the documents
and analysis which underlaid rulemaking proposals; additional rounds of notice-and-
comment rulemaking if the initial proposed rules were "significantly modified or if
public comments raised new issues;" and inclusion of "all relevant documentary anal-
ysis and data (including that generated within the agency or otherwise relied upon
by it in making decisions) in the materials available to the court on judicial review."
Id. at 1274-75 n.56 (citing Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckel-
shaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846
(D.C. Cir. 1972)).
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to more thorough judicial review. 2 1
Congress also contributed to this movement to increase agency account-
ability with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act of 1966,22 the
Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972,23 and the Government in the Sun-
shine Act of 1976.24 The executive branch also "undertook an increasingly
activist role in influencing the exercise of agencies' discretion" by taking
steps which included the imposition of cost analyses, impact analyses and
21. Id. at 1274-75. The more stringent review under the "hard look" cases has
been described by Judge Leventhal as follows:
The function of the court is to ...[insist] that the agency articulate with
reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the significance of
the crucial facts . . . . [An agency's] findings must cover all the substantial
differences between the applicants ....
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case of
procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative
charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combi-
nation of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a "hard look" at the
salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-mak-
ing.. . . If satisfied that the agency has taken a hard look at the issues with
the use of reasons and standards, the court will uphold its findings ....
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (foot-
notes omitted) (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); see also B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 204 (judicial review is at a watershed and a more positive
role is demanded by the changing character of administrative litigation).
One criticism of the "hard look" was that agencies were forced both to serve as
arbiters between the affected interests and to attempt to adjust those interests in what
amounted to an "essentially legislative process." Stewart, supra note 1, at 1683.
22. Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 378, 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1982)). The Freedom of Information Act "gave the citizen, for the first
time, a legally enforceable right of access to government files and documents." B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 50, at 128. For a detailed analysis of the Freedom of
Information Act, see K. DAvis, supra note 15, §§ 3A. 1-.25, at 68-87.
Professor Breyer has described the recent changes in administrative procedure as
attempts "to improve the legitimacy of agency decision making." S. BREYER, REGU-
LATION AND ITS REFORM 350 (1982).
23. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended as 5 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1-15 (1982)). The purpose of the Federal Advisory Committee Act was to
"promote the effective use of advisory committees in the executive branch of the
Government." H.R. REm. No. 1017, 92d Cong., 2d Sess 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3491. An "advisory committee" is any "committee,
board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or
any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof" created by statute or reorganization
plan, or by the President or one or more agencies in order to obtain advice or recom-
mendations. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3493.
Advisory committees have been criticized recently as favoring "those who have
vested economic interests in the panels' decisions." Phila. Inquirer, Feb. 29, 1984, at
5A, col. 1. The effectiveness of advisory committees as safeguards to increase agency
accountability could be undermined unless the government administers them more
carefully. Id.
24. Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 522b
(1982)). The Sunshine Act, which is codified as part of the APA, requires agency
heads to open to the public every meeting of an agency unless the agency finds that
the public interest requires otherwise. Id. § 552b(b), (c).
1510 [Vol. 29: p. 1505
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other controls. 25 As a result of these changes, rulemaking has become a more
formalized process.26 The new formalities have created an adversarial
rulemaking environment, causing the parties to adopt litigious "postures"
which frequently block the free flow of ideas and information. 2 7 In light of
these problems, commentators have discussed the pressing need for new
rulemaking procedures that will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
administrative action.
28
One suggestion for reform of the rulemaking process is the adoption of
regulatory negotiation.2 9 The advantages of regulatory negotiation include
25. Harter, supra note 6, at 12 (footnote omitted). Within the last decade execu-
tive orders have required cost and impact analyses for major rules and approval by
the agency head of all significant regulations. Id. at 3 n.8 (citing Exec. Order No.
11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg.
1017 (1976), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed.
Reg. 12,661 (1978); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981)).
26. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No.
82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1984) (Recommendation 82-4). When the APA was
passed, the rulemaking process was a "brief, expeditious notice and comment" proce-
dure. Id (introductory comments). However, as the scope of government regulatory
activity expanded, the rulemaking process was formalized in order to keep the agen-
cies' power in check. Id. For a discussion of the procedural limitations imposed to
preserve agencies' accountability, see notes 19-25 and accompanying text supra.
27. See Recommendation 82-4, supra note 26 (introductory comments); Harter,
supra note 6, at 19; see generally Regulatory Negotiation.- Joint Hearings Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Business and the Subcomm. on Oversight of Goo' Management of the
Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Joint Hearings] (statement of Kate C. Beardsley, Deputy Director, U.S. Regulatory
Council) (present system of establishing regulatory policy has many adversary aspects
with poor lines of communication between parties). The adverse consequences of
increased formalization were described by the Administrative Conference of the
United States:
The participants . . . tend to develop adversarial relationships with each
other causing them to take extreme positions, to withhold information from
one another, and to attack the legitimacy of opposing positions ...
Moreover, many participants perceive their roles in the rulemaking pro-
ceeding more as positioning themselves for the subsequent judicial review
than as contributing to a solution on the merits at the administrative level.
Recommendation 82-4, supra note 26 (introductory comments); see Schuck, Litigation,
Bargaining, and Regulation, 3 REG., July-Aug. 1979, at 26, 27.
28. See generally E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1; S. BREYER, supra note
22; Harter, supra note 6; Popper, An Admihistrative Law Perspective on Consensual Decision-
making, 35 AD. L. REv. 255 (1983); Stewart, supra note 1; Stewart, supra note 5;
Volner, supra note 3.
29. See generally Harter, supra note 6 (procedural agenda for the negotiation of
regulation). For a discussion of Mr. Harter's suggestions concerning regulatory nego-
tiation, see notes 34-74 and accompanying notes infra.
There have been a variety of other suggestions for reform of the regulatory sys-
tem. See generally S. BREYER, supra note 22, at 156-83 (suggestions for reform include
mandatory disclosure augmenting the preconditions of market entry, taxation as a
substitute for regulation intended to transfer income, creation of marketable property
rights in order to allocate permission to engage in the regulated behavior, changes in
tort liability laws, bargaining, and nationalization); A. STONE, REGULATION AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES 237-74 (1982) (identifying three groups which favor regulatory re-
form but disagree as to how reform should occur). Professor Stone discussed three
COMMENT 15111983-84]
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affording interested parties an opportunity to maximize the benefits they
will realize from regulation, 30 enabling parties to negotiate their real expec-
tations rather than adopting adversary postures, 31 and promoting more flex-
ible and consensual results. 3 2 Although negotiation of regulations has been
discussed as a viable option, only recently has a viable agenda for the negoti-
ation of regulations been proposed.
3 3
"orientations" toward regulatory reform which demonstrate the breadth of reform
proposals in addition to negotiated rulemaking. See A. STONE, supra, at 246-49 (citing
D. Welborn, Taking Stock off Regulatory Reform (paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1,
1977)). The first group of reformers discussed by Professor Stone, the "traditional-
ists," "advocate improved procedures, organization, and personnel as well as clearer
statutory mandates and additional powers to be given to regulators" in order to im-
pose " 'higher' social ends" upon the "narrow self-seeking ends of the unbridled mar-
ketplace." Id. at 247-48. The second group, the "restrictivists," harbor a general
dislike for government intervention and prefer that regulation, if it must exist, impose
the lightest burden possible on the regulated entities. Id at 248. Finally, the "popu-
lists" accept "regulation when it performs socially acceptable goals but [reject] it in
instances where regulation is viewed as aiding corporate interests." Id. In order to
further their ends, populists have "sought certain procedural and organizational re-
forms designed to reduce corporate influence at the legislative and administrative
levels . . . ." Id. at 249.
30. S. BREYER, supra note 22, at 177; see also Kerwin, Assessing the Effects of Con-
sensual Processes in Regulatoy Programs. Methodological and Polcy Issues, 32 AM. U.L.
REV. 401, 406-7 (1983) (consensual processes allow affected parties to negotiate their
expectations). For a discussion of the ordering of parties' expectations that is en-
hanced by regulatory negotiation, see notes 48-49 and accompanying text infra.
31. SeeJoint Hearings, supra note 27, at 107 (statement of Kate C. Beardsley, Dep-
uty Director, U.S. Regulatory Council). In discussing the potential benefits which
could be realized from regulatory negotiation, Ms. Beardsley explained that improv-
ing communication among parties could eliminate much of the adversariness that
pervades the development of regulatory policy. Id. For a discussion of the decrease
in adversary posturing which could result from regulatory negotiation, see note 41
and accompanying text ihfra. For a discussion of the decreased posturing in the de-
velopment of the OFCCP regulations, see note 86 and accompanying text infia.
32. See S. BREYER, supra note 22, at 178. One aspect of the flexibility that is
possible with regulatory negotiation arises in an industrial context where issues may
differ from one locale to another:
[B]argaining can adapt readily to the need for decentralized decision mak-
ing. Bargainers can negotiate one set of issues at the industry level, while
other issues are sent to local plants for resolution ...
This ability of a bargaining system to produce decentralized decision
making, to respond flexibly to differing local needs, and to bring about de-
centralized administration of the resulting agreements contrasts strongly
with classical regulatory systems, where rules tend to be broad, uniform,
and resistant to change.
Id.
For a discussion of the flexible structure of negotiated rulemaking which enabled
the OFCCP negotiators to meet in smaller groups to discuss issues which did not
involve all of the participants, see notes 88 & 97 and accompanying text infra.
33. See generally J. Dunlop, The Negotiations Alternati've in Dispute Resolution, 29
VILL. L. REV. 1421 (1984) (discussion of the negotiation process in light of its ascend-
ing importance in resolving disputes between conflicting interests). For a discussion
8
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III. REGULATORY NEGOTIATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES
A recent report and recommendation presented by Mr. Philip Harter to
the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) urged the adop-
tion of regulatory negotiation as an alternative method of drafting proposed
regulations. 34 The ACUS unanimously adopted Mr. Harter's proposal. 35
The ACUS' adoption of the Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regula-
tions was an important event because it was a rare example of an official
body formally criticizing the rulemaking process and suggesting regulatory
negotiation as an alternative.
36
Mr. Harter's proposal3 7 contained six "components" which discussed
how a regulatory negotiation ought to be conducted. 38 The first component
of the recently proposed "agenda" for regulatory negotiations, see notes 34-74 and
accompanying text infra.
In 1978, President Carter issued an executive order which instructed agencies to
consider using "open conferences" in order to "give the public an early and meaning-
ful opportunity to participate in the development of agency regulations." Exec. Or-
der 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 671, 672 (1981). However, no regulatory negotiation procedures
were promulgated with President Carter's order. For a discussion of the relationship
between Executive Order 12,044 and the OFCCP regulations discussed in Part Four,
see note 78 and accompanying text tnfra.
34. Recommendation 82-4, supra note 26. The report which Mr. Harter pre-
pared to accompany the ACUS' Recommendation 82-4 was the basis for a subse-
quent article which elaborated upon the proposed regulatory negotiation procedures.
See Harter, supra note 6, 1 n.*. At the time he prepared the report and recommenda-
tion, Mr. Harter was counsel to the ACUS. Popper, supra note 28, at 285. For a
discussion of Mr. Harter's procedures for regulatory negotiation, see notes 36-74 and
accompanying text ihfra.
35. Popper, supra note 28, at 285. The ACUS adopted Harter's proposal at its
June 18, 1982 plenary session. Id.
36. See Recommendation 82-4, supra note 26. The introductory comments to
Recommendation 82-4 criticized the increased formalization, development of adver-
sarial relationships among the parties, extensive factual records, and long periods of
delay which pervade rulemaking proceedings. Id. (introductory comments). The
ACUS suggested "provision of opportunities and incentives to resolve issues during
rulemaking, through negotiations" in order to improve the process and yield im-
proved rules. Id.
37. Recommendation 82-4 was the official action taken by the ACUS in re-
sponse to the report on which Mr. Harter based his article. See Harter, supra note 6,
at 1 n.*. In contrast with Recommendation 82-4, Mr. Harter's article explains the
rationale for every step of the proposed regulatory negotiation procedure. See id. at
42-102. One commentator has identified Mr. Harter's proposed agenda for the nego-
tiation of rules as a "seminal" work in the area of consensual alternatives to rulemak-
ing. Kerwin, supra note 30, at 406 n. 15.
38. See Harter, supra note 6, at 42. For a discussion of the "components" of Mr.
Harter's plan for regulatory negotiation, see notes 39-74 and accompanying text whfra.
Mr. Harter discussed 13 components which encompassed the regulatory negotiation
process from the beginning, through promulgation, to judicial review of negotiated
rules. See Harter, supra note 6, at 42-112. This comment will only discuss the first six
components which suggested how a regulatory negotiation might be conducted; the
remaining components go beyond the actual negotiation process and thus beyond the
scope of this comment. See id. Despite the interrelation of the components, the over-
all success of the negotiation does not turn on the success of any single component.
COMMENT 15131983-841
9
Sachs: An Alternative to the Traditional Rulemaking Process: A Case Stud
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
was a set of conditions intended to help convince the parties of the benefit to
be derived from regulatory negotiation and, as a result, "improve the likeli-
hood of successful negotiations."' 39 To improve the prospects for successful
negotiation, a threshold condition which should be satisfied prior to negotia-
tion is that the relative power among the parties should be "countervailing,"
so that no single interest can unilaterally impose a settlement upon any other
party.40 Once each party's power is countervailed, it will be difficult for
negotiators to remain in the intransigent, adversarial postures which pervade
the regulatory process.
4
'
See id. at 42. For example, even if a rule is not proposed following the negotiation, the
negotiation may nevertheless be "successful" because of the resulting reduction of
hostilities between the parties. Id.; see generally Harter, Dispute Resolution and Adminzs-
trative Law.- The Htoy, Needs, and Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV.
1393 (1984) (participants in negotiations concerning occupational exposure to ben-
zene did not reach consensus on a draft of a rule but the two groups were nevertheless
brought closer together by the experience).
39. Harter, supra note 6, at 42-51. Parties in a rulemaking procedure will not
participate in a regulatory negotiation merely because of the consensual nature of
negotiations; they must perceive some benefit to be derived from their negotiation of
the issues. Id. at 42-43. One characteristic of negotiations which will allow parties to
anticipate some additional benefit is that the consensual process allows participants
to "maximize the benefits they can obtain." Breyer, supra note 1, at 582. For a dis-
cussion of the conditions which constitute Harter's first component, see notes 40-50
and accompanying text infra.
An advantage of the negotiation process is that it allows a settlement to be struc-
tured that addresses the concerns of each party. See Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1423.
Professor Dunlop explained further that negotiation allows "[c]ontestants [to] achieve
a more satisfactory . . . settlement . . . than would be likely were the proceedings to
run their full litigious course." Id. An additional benefit from negotiation is the
significant reduction in cost derived solely from the shorter period of time needed for
a negotiated resolution. Id.
40. Harter, supra note 6, at 45-46. See also S. BREYER, supra note 24, at 179. An
in-depth discussion of bargaining power is beyond the scope of this comment. It
should be noted, however, that the requisite "countervailing power" would exist, de-
spite significant disparities in financial resources, if the "weaker" party has recourse
to procedures or actions which the "stronger" party deems unacceptable either be-
cause of the cost, delay, adverse publicity, or any other reason. See Harter, supra note
6, at 45-46. For a discussion of bargaining power, see H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982).
An additional form of countervailing power would exist if the parties were
aware that their failure to develop a negotiated rule would result in the initiation of
the traditional notice-and-comment procedures; this awareness may provide some of
the stronger interests with an incentive to avoid the costs and delays typically in-
curred in the more adversarial rulemaking process. See Note, supra note 6, at 1876.
The impact of legal recourse and judicial precedent will help to equalize the
power among the parties: "[T]he possibility of reverting to a court, to an administra-
tive agency or to legislative bodies is likely to be a continuing influence, and the
emerging precedents of litigation are likely to influence relative positions and bar-
gaining tactics." Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1426.
41. See generally Joint Hearngs, supra note 27, at 2 (statement of Sen. Gaylord
Nelson) (attempts to solve all regulatory problems through adversarial processes have
gone too far because each side stakes out a position it believes will maximize its bar-
gaining power); id. at 107 (statement of Kate C. Beardsley, Deputy Director, U.S.
Regulatory Council) (adversary aspects of current regulatory process forces parties to
[Vol. 29: p. 15051514
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The second condition, a fifteen party limit, was intended to improve the
interaction among the participants and thus enhance the free flow of is-
sues.4 2 Ideas will also be exchanged more readily if the issues to be resolved
by the negotiation are "concrete," and "ripe for decision," rather than im-
precise and vacillating.4 3 Despite the ripeness of the issues, some parties may
nevertheless benefit from maintenance of the status quo which would result
be "reactive" rather than "proactive"). For a discussion of the disadvantages that
result from adversary posturing, see note 27 and accompanying text supra.
Despite the disadvantages which arise from adversary posturing, such behavior
can play an extremely important role in the negotiation strategy of a party who is
committed to reaching a consensual agreement:
In negotiations the initial proposals for an agreement by any party
tend to be large or extreme relative to eventual settlement terms, except in
the case of a very few negotiators. It is important for observers or negotia-
tors to understand the reasons for such inflated proposals and the functions
that large initial proposals play in the negotiations process ...
Many initial proposals are large because they reflect the way they were
put together, usually by simply assembling the aspirations of the divergent
groups which comprise each party to the negotiations. In order to cut back
or scale down proposals, it is essential to establish priorities among groups
within the negotiating organizations. . .. [T]he process of priority setting
and scaling back proposals for one party or another is often an integral part
of the bargaining process itself.
Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1433. In addition, a substantial initial proposal may be
intended to facilitate a strategic concession in response to subsequent movements by
the other party. Id. at 1433-34. Parties might also propose impracticable ideas which
seem unduly adversarial, but are actually exploratory ideas intended to set the stage
for the negotiation of that issue in future years. Id. at 1433.
42. Harter, supra note 6, at 46; Harter, The Poh'tical Legitimacy and Judicial Review
of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 471, 479 (1983); see alsoJoit Hearings, supra note
27, at 22 (statement of Francis X. Murray, Director, National Coal Policy Project) (it
is important that negotiating group be limited in size to permit an effective negotia-
tion; large group with varying interest levels is not likely to be successful). In addi-
tion to the negotiation literature, "political science literature strongly indicates that
the likelihood of success decreases as the number of parties increases." Kerwin, supra
note 30, at 413 (footnote omitted). But see Popper, supra note 28, at 287. Professor
Popper criticized the choice of 15 participants in the negotiation: "To arbitrarily
draw the line at fifteen persons seems unrealistic. . . . [L]imiting participants without
reference to the particular situation seems unwise." Id. For a criticism of the 15
party limitation in light of the OFCCP experience, see notes 116-18 and accompany-
ing text infra.
43. Harter, supra note 6, at 47. Mr. Harter indicated that the parties to a negoti-
ation should not be "jockeying for position by filing lawsuits or threatening to do so,
building a media campaign, lining up political support, or exercising other methods
of generating and demonstrating power . . . ." Id (footnote omitted). Despite the
fact that parties should not be threatening to file lawsuits, in order to maintain the
appropriate countervailing power, the weaker parties must always have the capability
of filing a lawsuit and the stronger parties must be aware of this potential. See id. at
45-47.
One commentator has suggested that a more accurate description of the "ripe
issues" condition would explain that negotiations should only occur "where the posi-
tions of [the] parties have been clearly defined." Popper, supra note 28, at 286. Thus
if the parties had not yet resolved their stand on a set of issues, negotiations would
not be fruitful until their positions were established. See id.
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from the delays inherent in the decisional process.44 However, if a decision
were "inevitable" or "imminent," then the parties would have a sense of
urgency which would foster resolution of the issues.4 5
Mr. Harter also felt that the negotiation process would be more viable if
all parties would benefit from their participation in the negotiation. 46 Such
44. Harter, supra note 6, at 47. The time required for regulatory processes to be
completed under current methods can be significant; thus, any delay would prolong
the status quo and permit a benefit to inure to those interests that oppose the regula-
tory change. See generally S. Doc. No. 72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977) (Consumer
Product Safety Commission average rulemaking takes 16 months, average agency
licensing takes 19 months, and average ratemaking 21 months); Note, supra note 6, at
1879 (groups who benefit from the status quo would rather obstruct than bargain).
In light of this tendency for delay by parties who will benefit from the status
quo, one commentator has suggested that agencies devise incentives for parties to
bargain with open minds and "a sincere intention to reach an agreement." Note,
supra note 6, at 1879 n.47 (quoting Sign & Pictorial Union v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726,
731 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (good faith defined in context of labor negotiation)).
45. Harter, supra note 6, at 47. A variety of factors could make the parties per-
ceive an imminent decision. Id. For example, statutes or court orders may require
agency action within a particular period of time, or the agency may commit itself to
a "regulatory agenda" which lists the proposed regulations the agency expects to
issue by a given date. Id.
The reason for the imminence condition was that when the parties perceive a
sense of urgency "the most favorable climate for negotiation" exists. Id. One mecha-
nism that enhances the imminence of a decision is the imposition of a deadline:
A deadline serves a vital function in negotiations. It compels each side
to reach decisions and establish priorities that would not otherwise occur, at
least not so rapidly.. . . In the absence of a deadline, as. . . in . . . man-
dated decision-making in government regulatory agencies, the negotiators
or mediators often create articifical deadlines to try to bring issues "to a
head" and to resolution.
. . . A deadline is an institutional design to reduce dilatory postpone-
ment. It could be a natural deadline, as in the expiration of an old collec-
tive bargaining agreement, or a synthetic one, created by no less a necessity
than to catch an airplane or report to another scheduled meeting.
Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1436.
Despite the possibility that delay in the regulatory process may benefit some
parties by continuing the status quo, prompt decisions may also benefit other
participants:
For example, a company may wish to manufacture a new product or build
a new plant and an agency plans to issue regulations that will control as-
pects of the decision. The company may be afraid to proceed because it
fears that it may incur the substantial cost of modifying the product or
plant in response to the new regulation. The company then would prefer a
prompt decision by the agency.
Harter, supra note 6, at 48.
46. Harter, supra note 6, at 48-49. The initial benefits derived from negotiations
can be grouped roughly into procedural benefits and substantive benefits. See gener-
ally id. at 29 (substantive benefits); Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1448 (procedural bene-
fits). The procedural benefits of negotiated rulemaking arise from the reduced costs
to the parties and the shorter time needed for resolution as compared with a more
adversarial process. Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1448. The substantive benefits of nego-
tiated rulemaking were demonstrated by Harter in the context of a 1974 negotiation
concerning the placement of a proposed dam on the Snoqualmie River near Seattle,
Washington:
1516 [Vol. 29: p. 1505
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mutual benefit is possible where the nature of the issues permits a negotiated
resolution, but it is impossible where the issues are irreconcilable "funda-
mental values" which should be resolved by the legislature.4 7 Assuming that
fundamental regulatory issues cannot be negotiated fruitfully, the remaining
negotiable issues can be ranked according to the importance they hold for
each party.48 Ranking issues allows the development of agreements which
[A] group of environmentalists opposed the construction of a dam because
they feared it would lead to the development of a nearby valley. The pro-
ponents of the dam were farmers in the valley who were adversely affected
by periodic floods. Negotiations between the two groups . . . revealed a
common interest in preserving the valley. Without the negotiations the en-
vironmentalists would have undoubtedly sued to block construction, and
necessarily would have employed adversarial tactics. Negotiations, how-
ever, demonstrated the true interests of the parties and permitted them to
work toward accommodation.
Harter, supra note 6, at 29 (citing Sviridoff, Recent Trends in Resolving Interpersonal, Com-
munity and Environmental Disputes, ARB. J., Sept. 1980, at 3, 8).
47. Harter, supra note 6, at 49. Other commentators have also argued that fun-
damental issues should be resolved by the legislature. See Kerwin, supra note 30, at
410; Note, supra note 6, at 1880. If the legislature "fails to resolve conflicts in funda-
mental policy goals, it is unlikely that the subsequent regulatory programs that im-
plement those goals will be able to resolve such conflicts, irrespective of the
procedures used to make decisions." Kerwin, supra note 30, at 410 (footnote omitted).
Despite Mr. Harter's suggestion that successful negotiations should not attempt to
resolve fundamental issues, Congress nevertheless "enacts legislation containing
vague provisions that belie serious conflicts over fundamental values" principally be-
cause of "political pressures and inadequate information." Id. at 405 (citing Fiorina,
Legislative Choice of Regulatog Forms.- Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB.
CHOICE 1, 33-36 (1982)).
Other commentators have explained that many fundamental values are particu-
larly susceptible to resolution through consensual process: "ITihe problems around
which many (and perhaps the most important) social conflicts turn have no 'right' or
'wrong' answer in any moral or even technical sense. Such conflicts are best resolved
through a mechanism based not upon principle but upon pragmatic accommodation
and adjustment." Schuck, supra note 27, at 31; see also Kerwin, supra note 30, at 410-
11. Caution must be used in the weight accorded this condition lest parties discover
an easy "out" from negotiations simply by alleging "that a fundamental tenet is at
stake." Popper, supra note 28, at 286.
48. Harter, supra note 6, at 50. Ranking of issues presumes multiple issues exist
about which the parties will negotiate. Id. Because of the bargaining that would
occur in a regulatory negotiation, the true preferences of the parties would be ex-
posed. Schuck, supra note 27, at 31. Discerning the priorities of the parties is the key
to successful negotiations: "Indeed, negotiations . . . [are] often the art of putting
together packages that recognize the true priorities on each side that will 'sell' to both
parties informally as well as in any formal ratification process." Dunlop, supra note
33, at 1432-33.
Ranking the priorities of the participants also enhances the likelihood of compli-
ance with the resulting regulation: "The process of... trading off objectives . . . at
the bargaining table produces a result that may satisfy those involved more than
would an exogenously imposed standard." S. BREYER, supra note 22, at 178. An-
other benefit derived from the negotiation process is that the participants are more
aware of what is important to each other. SeeJoint Hearings, supra note 27, at 20-21
(statement of Francis X. Murray, Director, National Coal Policy Project).
Despite benefits which can be realized from ranked priorities, the ranking pro-
cess may prove very difficult. See Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1435. Ranking priorities
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are "novel approaches" because they maximize each party's interests and
permit more constructive solutions than the traditional, more adversarial
procedures allow.49 Frequently, the veracity or reliability of research be-
comes an issue in regulatory proceedings; as a final condition of the first
component, Mr. Harter cautioned that regulatory negotiation may be inap-
propriate if one interest controls information and excludes others from
access.
50
Once most of the requirements of the first component have been met
5
'
and the parties are convinced of the benefits of regulatory negotiation, it
becomes necessary to determine the correct participants. 52 One characteris-
tic which is relevant to this second component of the Harter proposal is the
mutability of the participants. As issues are resolved and new issues arise,
those parties directly interested in the subject at issue will change. 53 The
format of the negotiation should be capable of accommodating the represen-
tation of different interests at different times.54 Mr. Harter suggests that
consideration should be given to the ascertainment of which group or indi-
vidual would be the appropriate representative of each interest in the
necessitates an "internal ordering" by each participant and "forces each group to
consider not only whether it wants a specific objective-say, a health benefit-but
also how much it wants the benefit in comparison to other objectives, such as higher
pay or longer vacations." S. BREYER, supra note 22, at 177. "Internal ordering" is
not only an important intra-group concern: "[E]ach negotiator [should] appreciate
the informal governance of each side in order to understand the proposals and coun-
terproposals made in the negotiations." Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1432.
49. See Harter, supra note 6, at 50.
50. Id. If the parties agree on the need for research, however, negotiation can
resolve the subject of the research, and can determine who has the burden for gather-
ing the data. See id. at 51. For a discussion of how the negotiation procedure facili-
tated shared research between parties to the OFCCP consultations, see note 105 and
accompanying text infra.
51. Mr. Harter felt that the success or failure of a regulatory negotiation would
not be predicated upon the satisfaction of all of the components he suggested: "the
components of a proposal should be assessed separately." Id. at 42.
52. See id. at 52-57.
53. See generally id. at 53-54 (issues may expand or contract and interests repre-
sented may change during negotiations). For a discussion of the expansion and con-
traction of issues which necessitated ex parte meetings in the OFCCP negotiations,
see note 97 and accompanying text infra.
54. Although the "participants will change depending upon the issue being con-
sidered," only "those with direct and vital interests in the outcome" should be negoti-
ating. Joint Heangs, supra note 27, at 21-22 (statement of Francis X. Murray,
Director, National Coal Policy Project); see Schuck, supra note 27, at 31. For a discus-
sion of the selection criteria for the OFCCP negotiations, see note 101 and accompa-
nying text infra.
Mr. Harter illustrated the flexibility of interests which participate as follows:
"[Fjactual matters may require technical officials, whereas policy questions may re-
quire executive personnel." Harter, supra note 6, at 53-54. Mr. Harter's example is
inapposite. If the concern is that different iterests may warrant participation at dif-
ferent times, the example merely demonstrated that different representatives of an in-
terest may negotiate different issues. For an example of different tlerests
participating in the OFCCP negotiations, see note 97 and accompanying text ifra.
1518 [Vol. 29: p. 1505
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negotiations.
55
The Harter proposal discussed a series of financial considerations which
he felt would minimize the possibility that an appropriate representative
would be kept from participating because of a shortage of funds. 56 One such
55. Harter, supra note 6, at 54-55. The representative should have "sufficient
stature with the constituency he represents to adapt to changing situations in the
negotiations and to bargain accordingly while retaining the confidence of his constit-
uency. . . . [H]e must be able to make decisions in the . ..negotiations subject to
subsequent ratification by the representative's constituents." Id. (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to represent divergent
intragroup interests, see note 48 supra. Professor Dunlop has pointed out that over
the course of negotiations "more and more tension tends to arise within each
group ....... Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1435 (emphasis added). Professor Dunlop
explained further that "it is a practical rule-of-thumb that as one is nearing agree-
ment across the table, there is more difficulty within each side than between the
leading spokesman across the table." Id. Because a straightforward two-party nego-
tiation requires three agreements in order to resolve the negotiated issue, one agree-
ment between the parties and one agreement among the constituents of each
negotiating party, the choice of an appropriate representative of an interest must be
sensitive to the group dynamics which will affect the representative's ability to nego-
tiate. Id. at 1430-33.
Given the sensitive role played by an interest's representative in a regulatory
negotiation, Mr. Harter suggested that appropriate choices would be trade associa-
tions for industry groups, and consumer groups for consumer interests. Harter, supra
note 6, at 54-55. For a discussion of how the appropriate interests for the OFCCP
consultations were selected, see note 98 and accompanying text infra. Despite the
complications which may arise in the selection of appropriate representatives, the
procedure for assembling representatives to assist in the development of health and
safety regulations in Sweden suggests that these difficulties may be overcome:
When ASU, the Swedish safety agency, considers promulgating a safety
rule, it convenes a committee composed of labor, business and agency repre-
sentatives to consider the matter. The labor representative comes from LO,
Sweden's central organization of blue-collar workers, and the business rep-
resentative from SAF, the leading employers' association, which negotiates
nationwide collective bargaining agreements. Both organizations employ
full time OSH (occupational safety and health) experts. The committee
sends out standard proposals in draft form to local unions for comment.
Committee meetings are informal and no transcript is kept. ASU decides
who will be represented and the number of persons involved is small. ASU
has the ultimate decision-making power if agreement is not reached.
S. BREYER, supra note 22, at 180 (citing S. Kelman, Regulating Job Safety and
Health: A Comparison of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
and the Swedish Worker Protection Board (diss., Harvard University, 1978), pub-
lished sub nor. S. KEI.MAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWEDEN: A CoM-
I'ARATIVE STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY (1981)).
The choice of an appropriate representative also entails an inquiry into what
individual from the representative group will serve as negotiator. Harter, supra note
6, at 54. Harter explained that the negotiators "should be principals" rather than
subordinates in their organization. Id. at 55. One reason for the use of principals is
that intermediate-level spokesmen are often bound by instructions from superiors
and incapable of being flexible as the negotiations require. Id. at 55 n.303; see also
Note, supra note 6, at 1877.
56. Harter, supra note 6, at 56. The current rulemaking process allows participa-
tion by many parties because of the relative ease with which they can submit their
views to the agency. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 61, at 167-69 (cases
interpreting APA rulemaking provision emphasize that APA requires only an "op-
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consideration was that through negotiation of regulations, agencies would
realize a significant savings because funds currently expended to research
and defend proposed rules would not be needed.57 Thus, while the costs of
being represented at the promulgation stage would be greater with negotia-
tion, the consensual nature of the rule as promulgated should lead to total
costs no greater than, and perhaps less than, those under the current system.
Mr. Harter's third component involves a determination of whether the
agency which has chosen to submit a proposed rule to negotiation should
participate in those negotiations.58 Despite concerns that there should be
portunity" to submit written materials). The procedural requirements for rulemak-
ing that agencies must follow are codified in the APA: "After notice required by this
section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
As compared with current processes, regulatory negotiation may appear prohibi-
tively expensive to some interests. See Harter, supra note 6, at 56. If regulatory nego-
tiation is to offer a practicable alternative, agencies may have to "defray some
expenses" for interests whose participation is critical but lack sufficient funds. Id.
For a discussion of the financial assistance offered to participants in the OFCCP ne-
gotiations, see note 100 and accompanying text infra.
Mr. Harter noted that the Senate had recently passed an amendment to
§ 553(d)(5) of the APA which would prohibit "the use of appropriated funds avail-
able to any agency . . . [for the payment of] attorney's fees or other expenses of
persons participating or intervening in agency proceedings." Harter, supra note 6, at
56 n.308 (quoting S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3, 128 CONG. REC. S2713-14 (daily
ed. Mar. 24, 1982)). However, after the Senate passed this bill no further action was
taken on it. 1 CONG. INDEX 1981-82, 97th Cong., Senate (CCH).
57. Harter, supra note 6, at 56. One reason the costs of rulemaking will decrease
for the agencies is that the number of judicial challenges to rules would be reduced
by negotiation. Id. Professor Kerwin has explained that one advantage of consensual
processes is that they can "reduce the operational costs of reaching regulatory deci-
sions." Kerwin, supra note 30, at 408. Professor Kerwin noted that one reason for the
savings was the "inherent efficiency of regulatory negotiations that function similarly
to the procedure of common law litigation." Id. at 408 n.23 (citing R. POSNER,
ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Eftient Rules, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why is The Common Law
Etcient?, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977)); see generally R. POSNER, supra, at § 23.4 (goal of
administrative process is efficient legal regulation but structure of process is a source
of weakness because it is too political).
58. See Harter, supra note 6, at 57-67. Under the analysis used to determine the
appropriate participants, Mr. Harter noted that a strong argument could be
presented in favor of agency participation:
[T]he agency would seek to further its perception of the "public interest," as
defined by its organic statute, its existing policies, and the milieu in which it
operates. Thus, the agency representatives would attempt to develop a rea-
sonable regulatory response to the problem, based on criteria similar to
those that would be used if the agency itself were developing the regulation.
Id. at 57 n.316.
An additional observation about an agency's eligibility to participate goes to the
very heart of the question: "An agency's general orientation, function, motivation,
and ultimate rule would be the same in both traditional rulemaking and negotiation.
In sum, negotiating is an alternative means to the end of zssuing a regulation, not a funda-
mental alteration of the concept of the agency." Id at 58 n.316 (emphasis added).
Agency participation can also help make "the regulators aware of the underly-
1520
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countervailing power among participants, agency participation may be ap-
propriate because administrative agencies have realized a diminution of
power from their former status as "sovereign decisionmaker[si." 59 If an
agency participated in a regulatory negotiation, it could conserve resources
currently devoted to the "scientific and technical basis" of regulations. An
additional benefit the agency would realize comes from the shorter period of
time which its staff must devote for the development of a negotiated rule.
60
Most importantly, if the agency chose not to participate, the negotiators
would be forced to reach an agreement absent any indication of what result
would be acceptable to the agency.
6 1
Despite these advantages, there may be some disadvantages of agency
participation in the negotiation. 62 In order to avoid potential problems, Mr.
ing concerns of the parties." Joit Heartngs, supra note 27, at 20 (statement of Francis
X. Murray, Director, National Coal Policy Project). For a discussion of the benefits
of participation by Department of Labor officials in the OFCCP negotiations, see
notes 101-05 and accompanying text infra.
59. Harter, supra note 6, at 58. For a discussion of the restrictions on agency
actions, see notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra. Because of the more restricted
powers of agencies, they would be subject to countervailing powers just as the other
participants in a negotiation. Harter, supra note 6, at 58. For a discussion of the
Department of Labor's dual role as participant and ultimate decisionmaker in the
OFCCP negotiations, see notes 101-05 and accompanying text infra.
60. See generally Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1448 (negotiations would speed resolu-
tion); Harter, supra note 6, at 59 (regulatory negotiation offers more direct forum for
reconciliation of regulatory issues that currently take a long time to resolve and
agency will realize savings in amount spent on technical research if regulatory negoti-
ations used). For a discussion of the contributions of research from all of the partici-
pants in the OFCCP consultations, see note 105 infra.
61. Harter, supra note 6, at 60. An absence of "boundaries" indicating a range
of results acceptable to the agency would be antithetical to the concept of negotia-
tions. See id. Nonparticipation by the agency would be akin to a model of regulatory
negotiation called the "Agency Oversight Model." See Note, supra note 6, at 1875.
Under the agency oversight model the agency would not attend the negotiations:
"After the group reached agreement, standard APA informal rulemaking procedures
would begin." Id. (footnote omitted). Some difficulties inherent in this model are
that "negotiators must guess whether the agency will approve their agreement and
. . . the agency may hesitate to approve solely on the recommendation of interested
parties an agreement in which it played no part." Id. at 1877-78.
Mr. Harter has referred to an agency's potential hesitation to approve an agree-
ment as the " 'not invented here' syndrome." Harter, supra note 6, at 60. This occurs
when the agency staff supplants "the negotiators' judgments because it may perceive
a need to prove its merit and demonstrate its expertise." Id. Such action may thwart
any hope for an open exchange and good faith bargaining in future negotiations
involving that agency. See Popper, supra note 28, at 288.
For a discussion of the guiding role played by the preestablished parameters set
by the Department of Labor in the OFCCP negotiations, see note 103 and accompa-
nying text infra.
62. Harter, supra note 6, at 63-66. For example, the other negotiators may view
the agency as a " 'special' interest and . . . accord it an unusual status." Id. at 63.
Alternatively, parties may withhold information from the agency:
Effective regulation requires regulated enterprises to tell enforcement offi-
cials about suspected hazards, past failings, and constraints on abatement
efforts. However, a regulated enterprise will not voluntarily disclose its
15211983-84]
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Harter proposes that agencies participate, subject to the countervailing pow-
ers that affect them. 63 Mr. Harter also suggests that the agency retain final
regulatory authority by clearly informing all participants that the agency
will not be bound by the representations of its agent in the negotiations. 64
The fourth component identified by Mr. Harter in the development of a
regulatory negotiation is the process of "assembling the negotiators. '65 Ini-
tially, this component involves an "iterative process" conducted by a neutral
party to identify the interested parties and to determine whether sufficient
common ground for attaining an agreement exists. 6 6 Following a neutral
evaluation, the agency should select a convenor to determine the feasibility
problems to an agency unless it feels confident that information about its
weaknesses and mistakes and experiments will not become the basis of pros-
ecution, adverse publicity, or competitive disadvantage.
E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 109; see also Harter, supra note 6, at 63
(agency might misuse concessions and compromises made during negotiations).
63. Harter, supra note 6, at 64-65. Current practices by agencies indicate that
the balance between sovereignty and negotiation as a party is attainable:
In lawsuits challenging rules agencies routinely negotiate settlements in
which they agree to publish a particular notice of proposed rulemaking. In
these cases, senior agency officials must determine whether the agreement
comports with agency policy and is within the range of acceptable regula-
tory alternatives. . . . [TJhe agency representative negotiates subject to se-
nior official approval; he does not act as the sovereign agency making an
independent decision and holding firm.
Id. at 65 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the agency's role as negotiating party
and ultimate decisionmaker in the OFCCP negotiations, see notes 101-05 and accom-
panying text infra.
64. See Harter, supra note 6, at 66. An agency's negotiator should be a senior
official who has the ability to "assess and predict" the agency's position on a given
issue in order to ensure that the resulting regulation is acceptable. Id. For a discus-
sion of the consistency lent to the OFCCP negotiations by the participation of senior
agency officials, see note 107 and accompanying text thfra.
65. Harter, supra note 6, at 67. Whereas Mr. Harter's first component sought to
convince the parties of the benefits of negotiating rules as a general proposition, the
fourth component was intended to demonstrate to each party that it will be in their
best interest to participate. See id.
One commentator has suggested that negotiation offers general benefits to all
interests because it "fosters detente among participants and has few clear-cut losers.
All [participants] suggest solutions and ultimately believe they have at least partly
consented to the compromise rule." Note, supra note 6, at 1877; see also Popper, supra
note 28, at 255 (benefits of negotiation include: access to basic decisional process;
greater expectation of compliance; decreased cost of acquiring information; increased
reliability of information; and reduced cost of government regulation).
66. Harter, supra note 6, at 67-68. The initial determination of which interests
may be affected is important lest any group be inadvertently excluded:
[In the National Coal Policy Project] there were no consumer or Indian
representatives on the group. Mediators should be appointed at the outset
of negotiations and the mediator should be given at least 30 days to deter-
mine whether all of the significant parties are willing to participate and
whether they can agree on how to proceed.
Joint Hearngs, supra note 27, at 85 (statement of Roy N. Gamse, Deputy Asst. Admin-
istrator for Planning and Evaluation, Environmental Protection Agency).
The individual in charge of the iterative process may be an agency official, but
Mr. Harter cautioned that inquiries conducted by an agency official may intimidate
1522 [Vol. 29: p. 1505
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of negotiations, which interests should be represented, and who should repre-
sent those interests. 67 The final step in this component involves publication
of a notice in the Federal Register to ensure that "no organization with a sub-
stantial interest in the subject matter of the regulation was overlooked."'68
The fifth component of Mr. Harter's regulatory negotiation procedure
describes how the negotiations should be conducted. 69 In order to facilitate
the negotiation process, the participants should establish a set of ground
rules to guide the negotiations. 70 One of the most important ground rules
a party or cause unnecessary fears of retribution to arise if the party chooses not to
comply with the negotiation process. See Harter, supra note 6, at 68.
67. Harter, supra note 6, at 70-71. If the ACUS or the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service chose to expand their current functions, convenors could be
drawn from their ranks. Id. at 71; see also Joint Hearings, supra note 27, at 98 (state-
ment of Roy N. Gamse, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Planning and Evalua-
tion, Environmental Protection Agency) (American Arbitration Association or
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service would be good source for [convenors]).
The convenor's role is to determine whether regulatory negotiation would be
"feasible and superior to traditional rulemaking." Harter, supra note 6, at 75. A
convenor would not be appointed when a private, voluntary standards-writing or-
ganization exists which would be competent to conduct the negotiations without hav-
ing to establish "an entirely new framework for negotiations." Id at 76-77. The use
of private standards-writing organizations has received wide acceptance lately and
could provide a significant tool for the development of better rules. See generally Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 78-4, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.78-4 (1983) (recommendation for agency use of nongovernmental standards af-
ter standards have been developed and periodically revised by an open and regular
procedure).
In addition to the role played by a convenor, Mr. Harter suggested that the
services of a mediator may be required. Harter, supra note 6, at 77. The distinction
between the functions of a convenor, who facilitates negotiations by bringing the
parties together, and a mediator, who tries to "aid the negotiators in their quest to
find a compromise agreement," clarifies the procedure recommended by Mr. Harter.
See H. RAIFFA, supra note 40, at 23.
.68. Harter, supra note 6, at 79. Notice of proposed rulemaking must be pub-
lished in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). The APA requires that
notice shall include: "(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule
making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is pro-
posed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved." Id. at § 553(b)(l)-(3). Mr. Harter suggested that
the notice should include the following:
[A] description of the subject matter of the regulation; the representatives
comprising the proposed regulatory negotiation committee, including a de-
scription of the interest represented by each member and the position held
by each member; the name and position of the proposed agency representa-
tive; the name of the proposed mediator, if any; the issues the committee
proposes to consider; and a proposed schedule for completing the work of
the committee.
Harter, supra note 6, at 79. In order to comply with the APA, this notice should also
include a "reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed." 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(2) (1982).
69. See Harter, supra note 6, at 82-92. For a discussion of the absence of formal
negotiation procedures in the OFCCP negotiations, see note 79 infra.
70. Harter, supra note 6, at 82-83. Mr. Harter discussed Milton R. Wessel's Rule
of Reason, a set of dispute resolution principles, as an example of the ground rules that
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which the parties should agree upon is that the negotiations will remain con-
fidential in order to preserve intragroup support for the negotiator. 71 Fi-
nally, each negotiator should "focus on the respective interests, not on the
initial positions[,] . . . [s]eek options that allow mutual gain[s] . . . [and]
define objective criteria" in order to enhance his or her ability to pursue a
negotiated resolution. 7
2
The final component which affects the negotiation of rules was brief but
should guide negotiations. Id. at 83 (citing M. WESSE!., THE RULE OF REASON
(1976)). Wessel's Rule of Reason was developed as a method of dispute resolution for
corporate litigation, but it is nevertheless instructive as a set of negotiation guidelines:
Data will not be withheld because "negative" or "unhelpful." Conceal-
ment will not be practiced for concealment's sake. Delay will not be em-
ployed as a tactic to avoid an undesired result . . . . Motivation of
adversaries will not unnecessarily or lightly be impugned . . . . Dogma-
tism will be avoided. Complex concepts will be simplified as much as possi-
ble so as to achieve maximum communication and lay understanding ....
Relevant data will be disclosed when ready for analysis and peer review-
even to an extremist opposition and without legal obligation . . . . Re-
search and investigation will be conducted appropriate to the problem in-
volved. Although the precise extent of that effort will vary with the nature
of the issues, it will be consistent with stated overall responsibility to solu-
tion of the problem.
M. WESSEL, supra, at 23-24.
71. Harter, supra note 6, at 83-86. The requirement of confidentiality is criti-
cally important to the negotiation process. See Schuck, supra note 27, at 31. How-
ever, confidentiality in the regulatory process may be frustrated by statute. See
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982) (negotiation
groups would be advisory committees and must be open to the public except when
elaborate procedures are followed to make meetings private). Despite the apparent
complication caused by the FACA, Harter inferred that the agency could comply
with the criteria of the Sunshine Act and still have closed meetings. Harter, supra
note 6, at 85 & n.458; see 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982) (Sunshine Act). One way to avoid
the complications of the FACA is to conduct open meetings but break into private
"caucuses" when confidential discussions are needed. Interview with Philip Harter,
Panelist in the 1984 Villanova Law Review Symposium: "Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution," Villanova, Pa. (Feb. 25, 1984).
Confidentiality of the negotiations is very important in order to preserve the
intragroup support of the negotiator:
Negotiators desire to explain the concessions they have made and the
terms they have achieved directly to their constituents rather than have the
press or media initially make that explanation and state the merits, or defi-
ciencies, of the settlement. . . . Moreover, the performance in negotiations
and the appraisal of the results of negotiations is a major feature of the
political life of an organization that is decisive to the performance of leader-
ship. ...
The injection of the press into negotiations would make it even more
difficult for the principal negotiator, or the committee, to change positions.
The press reports would encourage those opposed to generate hostility as
the negotiations proceeded, before the settlement can be considered as a
whole.
Dunlop, supra note 33, at 1440. For a discussion of the effect of intragroup dynamics
upon the selection of an appropriate representative, see note 48 supra.
72. Harter, supra note 6, at 86-88 (emphasis and footnotes omitted). Mr. Harter
explained that "once the parties' respective interests are addressed, negotiations can
attempt to accommodate them." Id. at 87 (footnote omitted). The negotiators
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central to Mr. Harter's recommendations. In order for the parties to "reach
an agreement," they must have achieved a consensus of "all the represented
interests."7T3 To "mitigate the disruptive effect of an idealogue," the consent
of all members of the negotiating group is not necessary: a consensus is
reached when the representatives of each interest, operating as one through a
caucus, can agree with the result.
74
IV. CONSULTATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REGULATIONS
Since the ACUS' adoption of the Harter proposal, two agencies have
conducted regulatory negotiations following his model; neither negotiation
reached a consensus. 75 In contrast to these unsuccessful efforts to use Mr.
should seek options which allow mutual gain because "agreement is more likely to
occur if it can be cast in terms that permit each party to win." Id.
The Harter proposal's fifth component also suggested a "one text procedure" in
which a brainstorming session would be convened among the participants in order to
draw up a list of possible solutions that the negotiators could then comment on to
begin the negotiations. Id. at 88-89 (citing R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES
118 (1981)). The "single text procedure" will not be discussed further because such a
process would occur prior to the substantive negotiations and, as such, is beyond the
scope of this comment.
73. Id. at 92-97. "Consensus" defies rapid definition but could mean any of the
following resolutions of a dispute: "[U]nanimity; no 'reasonable' dissent; concurrent
majorities, in which a majority of each interest agrees; a substantial majority of those
present; [or] a simple majority." Id. at 92.
The principle benefits to be gained from requiring unanimity among negotiators
are that it "ensures that no interest will be outvoted . . . [and it] puts pressure on the
negotiators to make good faith compromises in their efforts to reach an agreement."
Id. at 94-95 (emphasis in the original). Mr. Harter ultimately rejected unanimity as
the appropriate standard for a consensus because of the ability of one party to stop
the negotiation "by its intransigence." Id. at 95.
The remaining alternatives were all options which Mr. Harter felt should be
explored further. Id. at 96-97. The first suggestion was that all dissents would be
considered "by an impartial and respected appeals body." Id. at 96. Alternatively,
the participants would be "identified by interest[,] . .. caucuses .. . [would be]
formed[,] . . .[and e]ach caucus of the group must then support the decision." Id.
Finally, a "substantial majority," such as two-thirds or three-fourths, might deter-
mine when a consensus has been reached. Id. at 97. The difficulty inherent in the
"substantial majority" was the fear of being outvoted which some interests may har-
bor. Id. To allay this fear, Mr. Harter suggested that the interest representation
aspect of a concurrent majority and the substantial majority could be combined. Id.
74. See i. at 96-97.
75. Harter, supra note 38, at 1407-09. The Department of Transportation at-
tempted a revision of regulations which determine pilots' flight duty status time, but
the parties were unable to reach a consensus. Id. at 1407-08. However, based on the
discussions, the FAA drafted a proposed rule upon which all of the interests agreed.
Id. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration also used Mr. Harter's pro-
cedures in the negotiation of regulatory standards for occupational exposure to ben-
zene. Id. at 1408-09. The participants in the negotiation were also unable to reach a
consensus. Id. This failure may be attributed to the short period of time OSHA had
provided for the development of a draft standard. Id. Despite the apparent lack of
success in the benzene negotiations, Mr. Harter explained that the participants had
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Harter's procedures, there have been other attempts to increase public par-
ticipation in the regulatory process. 76 One such attempt, which involved
substantial discussion among affected interests and resulted in the promulga-
tion of a proposed rule, was conducted by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP), an agency of the Department of Labor. 77
In conformance with an executive order issued by President Carter directing
agencies to increase public participation in the regulatory process, 78 the
OFCCP held "extensive consultations" prior to the promulgation of pro-
posed rules regulating equal employment opportunities among government
contractors. 79 These consultations were conducted during 1979 and 1980
among participants who had been invited to participate by the Director of
nevertheless come closer together than virtually anyone thought they would over so
controversial a regulation" during the negotiations. Harter, supra note 38, at 1409.
For a discussion of the pilots' flight duty status time negotiations and the benzene
exposure negotiations, see generally Harter, supra note 38. For a discussion of Recom-
mendation 82-4 (the ACUS' adoption of the Harter proposal), see notes 34-74 and
accompanying text supra.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has begun an evaluation of the
usefulness of "negotiations as a supplement to the current adversarial system of regu-
latory development." A.L.I.-A.B.A., COURSE OF STUDY MATER[Ai.S: ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW 153 (1984). The EPA is currently screening regulations to determine
which rules might be appropriate subjects of a regulatory negotiation. Id. at 155.
76. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978) (requiring that
agencies give the public opportunities for early and meaningful participation),
amended by Exec. Order No. 12,221, 45 Fed. Reg. 44,249 (1980), revoked, Exec. Order
No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,198 (1981).
77. 44 Fed. Reg. 77,006 (1979). The OFCCP promulgated a proposed rule on
affirmative action requirements for government contractors which had been "the
subject of extensive consultation with . . . [protected] groups . . . and contractor
groups." Id.
78. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978), amended by Exec. Order
No. 12,221, 45 Fed. Reg. 44,249 (1980), revoked, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg.
13,198 (1981). The public participation in open conferences and direct contact of
persons thought to have an interest were undertaken pursuant to Executive Order
12,044, which reads in pertinent part:
Agencies shall give the public an early and meaningful opportunity to par-
ticipate in the development of agency regulations. They shall consider a
variety of ways to provide this opportunity, including (1) publishing an ad-
vance notice of proposed rulemaking; (2) holding open conferences or public
hearings; (3) sending notices of proposed regulations to publications likely
to be read by those affected; and (4) notifying interestedparties drectly.
Id. (emphasis added).
79. 44 Fed. Reg. 77,006 (1979). The OFCCP developed revised regulations dur-
ing the Carter administration, using a consultation procedure which was similar to
the procedure which Mr. Harter proposed. Interview with Donald E. Elisburg, Esq.,
former Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employment Standards, in Washington, D.C.
(January 4, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Elisburg Interview]. Despite the similar proce-
dures, the OFCCP consultations were held prior to the publication of Harter's pro-
posals in 1982. See id; Harter, supra note 6. The consultation procedure brought
representatives of various interests together to react to proposed regulations which
the OFCCP had promulgated. Id. The purpose of the revised regulations which
emerged from the consultations was "to promote and ensure equal opportunity for all
persons, without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, employed or
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22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 6 [1984], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss6/12
1983-84] COMMENT 1527
seeking employment with Government contractors performing under federally as-
sisted construction contracts." 41 C.F.R. app. § 60-1.1 (1983).
Prior to publication in the Federal Register, the consultations were subject to
intensive participation by the public. Persons thought to have an interest were con-
tacted directly, and several open conferences were held. 45 Fed. Reg. 86,220 (1980)
(from analysis of§ 60-1.21 which was to be codified at 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.21 prior to its
indefinite postponement); see also 44 Fed. Reg. 77,006 (1979) (to be codified at 41
C.F.R. Parts 60-1, 60-2, 60-20, 60-30, 60-50, 60-60, 60-250, and 60-741) (proposed
December 28, 1979) (prior to publication as a proposed rule, extensive consultations
were held with all groups which are protected by laws which the OFCCP adminis-
ters).
The Department of Labor previously had employed informal procedures such as
preparation of drafts of proposed rules by affected interests, but the OFCCP regula-
tions were the first set of regulations in which all of the parties were "brought under
one umbrella." Id. For a discussion of the procedure followed during the OFCCP
consultations, see notes 83-115 and accompanying text infra.
The revised regulations which were negotiated during the Carter administration
are not currently codified as the OFCCP regulations. See generall 41 C.F.R. § 60-1 to
-741 (1983) (OFCCP regulations which were in effect prior to indefinite postpone-
ment of regulations developed under Carter administration); 41 C.F.R. app. § 60-1 to
-741 (1983) (OFCCP regulations which were negotiated under the Carter administra-
tion but postponed indefinitely by the Reagan administration). The Carter adminis-
tration revision of the regulations had been promulgated in final form and was
scheduled to take effect on January 29, 1981. It did not take effect, however, because
President Reagan ordered a 60 day postponement of the effective date for the new
OFCCP regulations on January 29, 1981. 41 C.F.R. app. § 60 (1983) (citing Presi-
dent's Memorandum of January 29, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,227 (1981)). Since the
initial postponement of the effective date, the revised OFCCP regulations were post-
poned four times prior to their indefinite postponement on August 25, 1981. Id. (cit-
ing 46 Fed. Reg. 9,084 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 23,742 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 33,033
(1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 36,144 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 42,865 (1981)).
One participant in the development of the revised OFCCP regulations opined
that the Carter administration did not expedite the promulgation of the new regula-
tions because of its belief that President Carter would be re-elected in 1980, thus
leaving four years to promulgate the final form of the regulations. Telephone Inter-
view with Nancy Kreiter, Research Director of Women Employed (February 28,
1984) [hereinafter cited as Kreiter Interview]. Ms. Kreiter stated that after President
Carter lost the election, there was a flurry of activity and a rush to promulgate the
revised regulations in final form. Id. The final form of the revised regulations was
not promulgated until December 30, 1980. See 41 C.F.R. app. § 60 (1983). After
only nine days in office, President Reagan postponed the effective date of regulations
which had taken two years to develop. Kreiter Interview, supra.
Despite their promulgation in final form, the indefinite postponement of the
OFCCP regulations has not yet been challenged in court. Kreiter Interview, supra.
The postponement of a set of Environmental Protection Agency regulations regard-
ing publicly owned water treatment plants, however, which were postponed by the
same Presidential Memorandum as the OFCCP regulations, has been challenged on
the ground that it operated "effectively as a repeal, [and thus] constituted rulemak-
ing" and should have been subject to the APA rulemaking requirements. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 761-64 (3d Cir. 1982) (EPA's
indefinite postponement of regulations was an action which fit the definition of a
"rule" under APA and was subject to the notice and comment procedures required
by the APA). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained why a postponed effec-
tive date constitutes rulemaking as follows:
In general, an effective date is "part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and of future effect." It is an essential part of any
rule: without an effective date, the "agency statement" could have no "fu-
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the OFCCP, Mr. Weldon Rougeau. 80
The consultation procedure was not intended to test Mr. Harter's pro-
posal or any other recommendations concerning the viability of negotiation
as a new method of rulemaking. 8 1 One participant in the OFCCP consulta-
tions explained that the procedure used was, in part, the result of extensive
lobbying by affected interests which wanted to be included in the develop-
ment of new OFCCP regulations. 82 The OFCCP's successful use of consul-
tations offers a unique opportunity to study the regulatory negotiation
process in light of Mr. Harter's recommendations.
At the beginning of the OFCCP consultations there was a possibility
ture effect," and could not serve to "implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy." In short, without an effective date a rule would be a nullity
because it would never require adherence.
If the effective date were not "part of an agency statement" such that
material alterations in that date would be subject to the rulemaking provi-
sions of the APA, it would mean that an agency could guide a future rule
through the rulemaking process, promulgate a final rule, and then effec-
tively repeal it, simply by indefinitely postponing its operative date. The
APA specifically provides that the repeal of a rule is rulemaking subject to
rulemaking procedures.
Id. at 761-62 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1982)); see also Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 812-16 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (effect of an EPA deci-
sion to defer processing of operating permits for existing hazardous waste incinerators
and storage impoundments was to suspend regulations which created standards; such
action was rulemaking, and, absent notice and opportunity for comment on decision
to defer processing, must be vacated).
80. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79; Kreiter Interview, supra note 79; Tele-
phone Interview with Barry Goldstein, staff attorney, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Washington, D.C. (February 28, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Gold-
stein Interview]. For a discussion of which interests were present at each consulta-
tion, see note 88 and accompanying text bnfra. The groups which took part were
interest groups which were protected by either Executive Order 11,246, § 402 of the
Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, or § 503 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973. 45 Fed. Reg. 86,216 (1980) (citing Exec. Order 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.); Vietnam Era Veterans' Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
508, § 402, 88 Stat. 1578, 1593 (amending 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1982)); Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 503, 87 Stat. 355, 393-94 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 793 (1982))).
81. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. Negotiation in the development of rules
was not a new process in the Department of Labor when the OFCCP regulations
were being developed. Id. Mr. Elisburg explained that despite the fact that the De-
partment of Labor generally employed more information processes than other de-
partments, the development of the OFCCP regulations was the first time that the
parties were brought together "all under one umbrella." Id.
82. Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Kreiter explained that lobbying for the
consultations between the OFCCP and the affected interests began at the end of the
Ford Administration. Id. Efforts to establish consultations continued during the
early months of the Carter Administration, especially in the Senate hearings on the
appointment of Department of Labor officials. d. As a result of this lobbying, many
of the officials ultimately appointed in the Carter Administration had indicated a
willingness to conduct prepromulgation consultations with interests which would be
affected by any new equal employment opportunity regulations. Id.
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that the power of the interests participating would not be countervailing. 83
However, as the discussions developed, the strength and experience of the
contractor groups was quickly countervailed by a coalition among the wo-
men's, black, and hispanic groups.8 4 This development of a balance of
power, which kept any one interest from dominating the process, was one
factor that Mr. Harter felt would convince the parties that they could bene-
fit from the negotiation procedures.
8 5
Despite the countervailing power between the participants, they never-
theless adopted negotiating postures which resembled adversarial postures.
However, these postures were used principally as negotiation tools, not for
litigious arguments. 8 6 One example of an adversarial posture was the initial
demand of the women's groups that pregnancy disability rights had to be
included in the regulations. The negotiated resolution of this demand was
that the issue had been adequately addressed by title VII.
8 7
83. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. Mr. Elisburg stated that at the beginning
of the discussions the employer groups were well-organized and experienced at deal-
ing with the negotiation process. Id. In contrast, Elisburg explained that many of
the women's and hispanic groups had been organized only recently, and were "feel-
ing their way" in the administrative process. Id.
84. Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Prior to the consultations, the women's
groups and the other civil rights interests met in order to coordinate their efforts in
preparation for the development of the new OFCCP regulations. Id
In response to the questions: "How many other groups had interests that were
similar or related to your group's," Barry Goldstein, from the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, replied that a number of groups shared similar interests, in-
cluding "many women's groups." Goldstein Interview, supra note 80. Nancy Kreiter,
from Women Employed, stated that approximately 10 or more groups had similar
interests and as many as 5 or 6 other women's groups were participating. Kreiter
Interview, supra note 79.
Barry Goldstein opined that because a Democratic President was in office while
these regulations were being developed, the minorities and women carried more
weight than they would have under a Republican administration. Goldstein Inter-
view, supra note 80.
For a discussion of countervailing power in Mr. Harter's recommendation, see
note 40 supra.
85. For a discussion of the conditions which comprise Mr. Harter's first compo-
nent, i.e., convincing the parties of the benefits of negotiation, see notes 39-50 and
accompanying text supra.
86. Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. For a discussion of the benefits of adversial
posturing in a negotiation context, see note 41 supra.
Donald Elisburg explained that when the parties began the consultations, there
was a lot of loud disagreement until "the extremes were worked out." Once the
extremes were moderated, the parties "began to talk with each other" and construc-
tively discuss proposals for the new regulation. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. For
a discussion of the strong guiding role played by the agency which helped foster
negotiation and end adversial posturing during the OFCCP consultations, see notes
101-05 and accompanying text infra.
87. Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it is an "unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dzscrbninate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000 e-2 (1982) (emphasis added).
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The OFCCP consultations were conducted in two discrete forms: large
and small.88 Although the larger consulations, which typically had twenty-
five to thirty participants, exceeded Mr. Harter's recommended maximum
of fifteen participants, Donald Elisburg, a former agency official, stated that
OFCCP consultations would not have been fruitful if any interest with
"clout" had not participated. 89
Another condition in the Harter proposal was that the subject matter of
88. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79; Goldstein Interview, supra note 80. The
large consultations had between 20 and 30 participants representing the OFCCP and
all of the affected interests. Id. The OFCCP took part in two types of small meetings.
The first small meeting format typically involved the OFCCP and all of the groups
which made up a discrete interest-such as the women's groups. Id. The second
small meeting format entailed ex parte meetings which took place between the
OFCCP and one group. Id.
Nancy Kreiter recalled that the "big, overall meetings" only occurred "three
times at most." Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Despite Ms. Kreiter's recollection,
Donald Elisburg explained that there were "at least 20-25 participants at the table
for most discussions." Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. The advantage of these
larger consultations was that parties could explain their position directly to the op-
posing interests rather than to government officials in a more formal regulatory pro-
ceeding. Goldstein Interview, supra note 80; Kreiter Interview, supra note 79.
Ms. Kreiter stated that there were many occasions when she and representatives
of the other women's groups met with OFCCP officials without the presence of any
other interests. Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. The group which Ms. Kreiter repre-
sented, Women Employed, also met one-on-one with agency officials because it was
one of the leading women's groups which took part in the OFCCP consultations. Id.
Despite Women Employed's significant role, Nancy Kreiter explained that a
consensus could not have been reached without the inclusion of the other women's
groups. Id. When asked whether any one women's group could have adequately
represented the interests of women in order to facilitate the 15 party limit suggested
by Mr. Harter, Ms. Kreiter replied: "The women's groups would never agree." Id.
As Ms. Kreiter explained, the OFCCP conducted ex parte meetings with partici-
pants throughout the consultations. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. The agency
was careful to maintain a record of these meetings, however, in order to avoid allega-
tions of impropriety. Id, see Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57, (D.C. Cir.)
(if ex parte contacts occur, any written document or a summary of any oral commu-
nication must be on the record immediately after receipt so that interested parties
may comment on the ex parte contacts), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
89. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. Mr. Elisburg was the Assistant Secretary
of Labor for Employment Standards when the OFCCP held its consultations. He felt
that more than 15 participants could be accommodated in a regulatory negotiation
without compromising the integrity of the give-and-take which occurs among the
participants. Id.
An additional reason why a limitation of 15 parties would be too restrictive is
the profusion of special interest groups which have emerged from the post-World
War II era. See generally T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 50-51 (1969) (discussing
the development of "interest-group liberalism"). Organized labor, for instance, has
spawned splinter groups which remain within the ambit of organized labor but
which also pursue the interests of highly differentiated classes of employees. Elisburg
Interview, supra note 79. Despite the apparent commonality of interests between spe-
cial interest groups, such as the women's groups in the OFCCP consultations, the
groups would have refused to yield total negotiating responsibility to any one group.
Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Thus, in some regulatory negotiations the breadth
of issues and profusion of interested parties may require that more than 15 partici-
[Vol. 29: p. 15051530
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the negotiations should be "concrete" and "ripe for decision." 90 This condi-
tion was met in the OFCCP consultations because Executive Order 11,246,
which authorized the regulations, had narrowed the subject matter by
resolving the political issues in favor of affirmative action.9 ' Thus the only
task which the discussions had to accomplish was the development of a plan
to implement the order.92 The OFCCP consultations also satisfied Mr. Har-
ter's negotiation-enhancing condition of imminence. All of the participants
were aware that it was in their best interest to reach an agreement because
the promulgation of proposed rules by the Department was imminent.
93
The concreteness of the issues combined with the imminence of a regulation
in the absence of a negotiated proposal helped to convince the participants
that the consultations were the one mechanism that would offer all partici-
pants an opportunity for gain.
94
pants represent the affected interests. But see Harter, supra note 38, at 1409 n.75 (ben-
zene negotiations were conducted with only 8 participants).
For a discussion of Mr. Harter's 15 party recommendtion, see note 42 and ac-
companying text supra.
90. See Harter, supra note 6, at 47; Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. The
OFCCP consultations were held in order to develop procedures for implementing
equal employment opportunity regulations pursuant to Executive Order 11,246. See
41 C.F.R. App. § 60.1-1 (1983). When the parties began consultations, their points of
view were well-defined. This refinement facilitated a more efficient exchange of
ideas. Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. For a discussion of ripe issues in regulatory
negotiations, see note 43 and accompanying text supra.
91. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.) (amended by Exec.
Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967), Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg.
12,985 (1969), Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501 (1978)), reprited in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1982); see generally Nash, Affirmati've Action Under Executive Order 11,246,
46 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 225 (1971) (discussion of the various policy choices made by the
President to narrow the range of possible actions which the agency could take in
implementing the Executive Order).
92. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. As Mr. Elisburg commented: "[H]ow you
get there is what was left to regulate." Id.
93. See Goldstein Interview, supra note 80; Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. One
of the most important factors which caused "at least grudging acceptance" of the
consultations was the participants' knowledge that if the discussions failed to reach
an agreement then the Secretary of the Department would promulgate new regula-
tions which might not have been as favorable as those that would come from the
consultations. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. From the beginning of the consulta-
tions the participants were aware of the Department of Labor's stated objectives.
Goldstein Interview, supra note 80. Those objectives consisted of about "ten broad
topics [on which the Department was] trying to get [a] broad consensus." Kreiter
Interview, supra note 79. In addition to full knowledge of the Department's goals, the
parties were informed that the "Department had a strong enforcement posture" re-
garding the regulations. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. Awareness of the goals
and of the likely enforcement of the regulations contributed to a perception of immi-
nence which enhanced the discussions. Id.
94. d. The OFCCP consultations were the sort of situation in which all could
realize gains and thus be "better off for having negotiated." Harter, supra note 6, at
48-49 (describing a "win/win" situation in which both sides realize gains from their
participation). The Department was given a broad mandate from the President
which called for affirmative action to combat employment discrimination but was
left with the task of implementing and enforcing the mandate. Elisburg Interview,
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Mr. Harter's second component dealt with the selection of appropriate
parties for a regulatory negotiation. 95 As mentioned above, the consulta-
tions were conducted through both large and small discussions. The smaller
sessions were among groups with common interests or ex parte discussions
between the OFCCP and various interests. 96 This flexible format enabled
the resolution of problems specific to an interest group without hindering the
overall progress of the consultations.9 7 The interest groups invited to partici-
pate in the consultations were chosen by the Director of the OFCCP,98 and
each participating organization chose its own representative to attend the
consultations.99 The OFCCP employed some representatives as "consul-
tants" in order to promote the participation of the financially disadvantaged
supra note 79. When the imminent regulatory action was combined with the Depart-
ment's desire to "ease the pain on the affected parties without making any other
parties suffer," the best opportunities for gain were available only if the parties took
part in the consultations. Id.
In addition to these substantive gains from negotiation, many of the groups real-
ized procedural benefits as well. See Kreiter Intereview, supra note 79. For example,
as a leader among the women's groups, Women Employed performed a lot of the
mundane preparatory work from which all of the women's groups and some of the
civil rights gruops benefited. Id. For a discussion of the distinction between substan-
tive and procedural benefits, see note 46 supra.
95. For a discussion of Harter's second component, see notes 53-57 and accom-
panying text supra.
96. For a discussion of the types of consultations which took place in the devel-
opment of the OFCCP regulations, see note 88 and accompanying text supra.
97. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. Mr. Elisburg stated that the Director of
the OFCCP, Weldon Rougeau, met frequently with various interests in order to allay
the participant's fears of an adverse regulation and to maintain the progress of the
consultations. Id.
98. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79; Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Nancy
Kreiter recalled that the invitation to participate in the consultations was extended
by Weldon Rougeau, Director of the OFCCP, but "in reality, there had been groups
expressing interest [in consultations], and these 'lead groups' were each suggesting
other groups." Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Many interests, such as Women
Employed, had been dealing with the OFCCP over the years and were logical selec-
tions for the consultations. The selection process for the OFCCP consultations was
less of an "iterative process" than Harter foresaw because many of the interests were
self-selecting. See id.; Harter, supra note 6, at 67-68. However, the OFCCP consulta-
tions demonstrated that the agency can serve as "convenor" in a regulatory negotia-
tion. Cf Harter, supra note 6, at 67-68 (noting that agency is the "obvious
organization" to assemble the negotiators, but discussing potential benefits from hav-
ing some other entity assemble the group).
99. Goldstein Interview, supra note 80; Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Barry
Goldstein explained that the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund "did not
engage in a formal [intragroup selection] process." Goldstein Interview, supra note
80. Goldstein had done employment discrimination work since 1971. This experi-
ence and his presence in the Washington office of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund contributed to his selection for the OFCCP consultations. Id
On the other hand, Women Employed did not use such an informal selection
process. Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Nancy Kreiter, research director for Wo-
men Employed, was Director of Advocacy, and because of her "training as an econo-
mist, dealt with all regulations." Id
1532 [Vol, 29: p. 1505
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The Department of Labor's participation in the OFCCP consultations
served to stabilize the consultations.' 0' Because of the Department's partici-
pation, potentially volatile disagreements were successfully defused in the
early stages of discussion. 10 2 In addition, in situations where the participants
were unable to narrow the distance separating their positions, they were
guided by preestablished parameters which the agency deemed accepta-
ble.103 Despite the potential problems which Mr. Harter felt could result
from agency participation, the Department of Labor was a welcomed party
to the OFCCP consultations. 10 4  Donald Elisburg explained that the
agency's participation enhanced communication between the public and
private sectors because it allowed for the exchange of ideas between two in-
terests which did not previously understand each other. 10
5
100. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. The Department of Labor retained rep-
resentatives of needy interests as "consultants" to the OFCCP consultations. Id. Mr.
Elisburg explained that this arrangement was "open and straightforward" and did
not foster any allegations of impropriety. Id.
Although her airfare may have been paid by the Department of Labor, Nancy
Kreiter did not recall receiving any additional financial assistance. Kreiter Inter-
view, supra note 79. Nor did the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund re-
ceive any financial assistance from the government. Goldstein Interview, supra note
80. Both Kreiter and Goldstein expressed the opinion that government financing
may be an important idea for the future. Id.; Kreiter Interview, supra note 79.
101. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79.
102. Id. Elisburg explained that in the early stages he spent a significant
amount of time "defusing the yelling." Id. After the difficulties of the early consulta-
tions subsided, the government found itself in a novel role: rather than hearing argu-
ments and then striving to develop a regulation, the agency encouraged a dialogue
among the groups. Goldstein Interview, supra note 80; Kreiter Interview, supra note
79.
103. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. The Department of Labor informed all
of the parties to the negotiation that it planned to pursue a strong enforcment pos-
ture and that the regulations would reflect that policy. Id. As a result, the regula-
tions ultimately promulgated "were very close to what the parties had been told [by
the Department of Labor] all along." Id. The advantage of the negotiations, how-
ever, was that the resultant regulation, though necessarily within the predetermined
parameters, reflected a consensus among the interested parties. Id.
104. Goldstein Interview, supra note 80. Barry Goldstein agreed "strongly" with
the proposition that the Department of Labor was an appropriate participant in the
consultations. Id. For a discussion of the potential disadvantages Mr. Harter sees in
agency participation in regulatory negotiations, see note 62 supra.
105. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. Mr. Elisburg felt that the consultations
enhanced government's perception of the private sector and vice versa: "Most people
in government have no sense of how business is run as a business, [and at the same
time] the business community has no comprehension of how government does busi-
ness." Id. Because many of the equal employment opportunity issues involved un-
derstanding how business operates, the consultations helped the parties "understand
what the other [party] is doing." Id
Mr. Elisburg opined that in an era when agencies are no longer regarded as
experts, it is not surprising that "the OFCCP had to rely on industry to know what
was going on in business." Id.; see generally S. BRVFER, supra note 22, at 3 (persons
appointed to regulatory offices are not necessarily experts).
The agency's participation also enhanced other types of information exchanges.
COMMENT 15331983-841
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Mr. Harter identified potential disadvantages which could arise from
agency participation in regulatory negotiation. As particularly disruptive
complications which could result from agency participation, he discussed the
participants' fear of misuse of negotiated concessions in further dealings with
the agency, and the parties' prolonged posturing caused by their belief that
the agency would promulgate a proposed rule regardless of the outcome of
the negotiation.' 0 6 Despite these potential disadvantages, the OFCCP offi-
cials found that their active participation was important to the success of the
consultations. 107
Harter's fourth component discussed assembling the negotiators.'0 8
Some of the parties for the consultations were selected by Weldon Rougeau,
Director of the OFCCP, based upon their prior interest in equal employ-
ment opportunity consultations. Other parties were chosen following a mod-
ified iterative process conducted by Mr. Rougeau. 10 9 Rougeau's function
In the course of the consultations, a difficult issue was how regulated employers could
determine the availability of qualified minorities and women. Goldstein Interview,
supra note 80. To resolve this issue, the Department of Labor funded a study to
develop a model for availability analysis. Id; see generally D. Berry, M. Phillips, S.
Wilson, Apt Associates Publications No. 81-17, Restructuring Availability Analysis
for Affirmative Action Planning (1981) (photocopies available at a nominal charge
from Apt Associates, Cambridge, Mass.).
106. For a discussion of the potential disadvantages arising from agency partici-
pation in regulatory negotiation, see note 62 supra.
107. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79. One potential problem which could
have arisen from the agency's participation, the treatment of the OFCCP as a special
participant, did not occur in the consultation. Id.
The agency's representatives in the consultations were Weldon Rougeau, Direc-
tor of the OFCCP, and Donald Elisburg, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employ-
ment Standards. Id. One participant pointed out that in addition to the top-level
agency employees acting as the OFCCP's representatives, the consultations might
have benefited from the participation of middle-level employees. Goldstein Inter-
view, supra note 80. Mr. Goldstein felt the middle-level should take part because of
the "critical information they have" concerning past regulations, and because "they
are the ones who will have to enforce the new regulation." Id. Nevertheless, the
participation of senior officials was important because the officials were able to allay
any fears that the resulting regulations would not fulfill the OFCCP's stated objec-
tives. For a discussion of the OFCCP's firm enforcement posture as an example of its
stated objectives, see notes 101-05 supra.
108. For a discussion of Mr. Harter's fourth component, see notes 65-68 and
accompanying text supra.
109. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79; Goldstein Interview, supra note 80; Krei-
ter Interview, supra note 79. For a discussion of the prior interest some groups had
demonstrated in consultations with the Department of Labor, see note 98 supra. Wel-
don Rougeau invited the groups which had previously expressed their interest to take
part in consultations concerning equal employment opportunity. Kreiter Interview,
supra note 79. In addition, Mr. Rougeau's dialogue with these groups resulted in the
suggestions of other groups which would be interested in participating in the consul-
tations. Id. Without consciously planning an iterative search to identify interests,
Rougeau pursued a course of action which was similar to the method Mr. Harter
suggested for the identification of interests. For a discussion of the iterative process
which Harter recommended, see note 66 and accompanying text supra.
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was equivalent to the role which Mr. Harter labelled "convenor."1 0 Once
Mr. Rougeau invited the participants, the agency did not attempt to publish
a notice of the consultations in the Federal Register. I I I
The consultations were not subject to a set of ground rules such as those
suggested in Mr. Harter's fifth component. Despite the absence of ground
rules, the confidentiality of the consultations was maintained by precluding
the press from the discussions.' 12
The regulations, which were promulgated in final form following the
consultations, were not supported by a "consensus" as Mr. Harter defined
the term.'" 3 In fact, Donald Elisburg explained that some interests felt the
results of the consultations were "terrific" while others felt the results were
"awful." ' "1 4 However, the unifying factor among the groups was their
awareness that the consultations had resulted in an agreement that they
would have to live with regardless of any post-agreement discord."1 5
IV. RECONCILING THE HARTER PROPOSAL WITH THE OFCCP
EXPERIENCE
The negotiation of administrative rules and regulations constitutes a vi-
able alternative process for agency rulemaking. However, the development
of the OFCCP regulations illustrated that several aspects of Mr. Harter's
procedures may require modification if negotiated rulemaking gains wide-
spread acceptance.
Mr. Harter suggested that a maximum of fifteen participants should
take part in the negotiation of a rule. Although he noted that his choice of
fifteen participants was initially based on consideration of comfort at the
negotiating table,' 1 6 Mr. Harter has, on four separate occasions, confirmed
110. For a discussion of the role played by a convenor in regulatory negotiation,
see note 67 and accompanying text supra.
111. See 44 Fed. Reg. 77,006 (1979) (proposed Dec. 28, 1979) (publication of
proposed rule by OFCCP which was first public solicitation of comments by
OFCCP).
Although no notice was published prior to the consultations, the OFCCP did
consult with, or offer to consult with, the "groups protected under the three laws
administered by the" OFCCP, as well as "contractor groups . . . [and] other inter-
ested groups such as unions and public interest groups." Id.
112. Kreiter Interview, supra note 79. Nancy Kreiter explained that regardless
of the advantages of confidentiality during the actual consultations, she has found
that her ability to remind various employer groups of the concessions they made
during the consultations has been especially helpful in light of the indefinite post-
ponement of the regulations. Id.
113. For a discussion of Harter's definition of a consensus, see notes 73-74 and
accompanying text supra.
114. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79; see Kreiter Interview, supra note 79 (con-
tractor groups were unhappy with regulation as ultimately promulgated, which is
why they lobbied extensively and successfully for President Reagan to postone the
effective date).
115. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79.
116. Harter, supra note 6, at 46 n.257. Harter has explained that his choice of a
15 participant limit was arbitrary. Philip J. Harter, address before Administrative
1983-84] COMMENT 1535
31
Sachs: An Alternative to the Traditional Rulemaking Process: A Case Stud
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
this number as being optimal for negotiated rulemaking.'17 Nevertheless,
the OFCCP negotiations indicated that fruitful negotiations can occur with
larger groups. It is submitted that Mr. Harter should revise this portion of
his proposal in order to provide a more flexible approach to negotiation
which would allow a more complete representation of the interested
parties. 118
Another benefit which Mr. Harter predicted would inure to all affected
parties was a decrease in adversarial contentiousness. It is perhaps unrealis-
tic to expect a decrease in litigious posturing from negotiators when such
posturing may constitute an integral component of a party's negotiating
strategy.' 19 Mr. Harter's proposal fails to recognize that the parties will
often vehemently disagree at the beginning of the negotiation, but that the
intensity of the disagreement will be mitigated by subsequent
negotiations. '
20
One force which helped to foster a constructive exchange of ideas was
the OFCCP's willingness to mediate in the early, adversarial stages of the
negotiation. 12' In addition, the availability of agency officials to meet pri-
vately with affected interests allayed the fears that stronger interests would
dominate the discussions. This action helped to provide the countervailing
power between the parties which Mr. Harter felt was central to a successful
regulatory negotiation. 122 Although some of the benefits from agency par-
ticipation arise from the representative's seniority and the concomitant re-
spect which the other negotiators will have for him, it is submitted that Mr.
Law class at Villanova School of Law (April 5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Harter
Speech]. When Mr. Harter first presented his proposal for negotiated rulemaking to
the ACUS, he was questioned about the reason for adopting a 15 participant limit.
d. Mr. Harter recalled anecdotally that he did not have any group dynamics evi-
dence to support the choice of 15, but that a quick count of the table where his
proposal was being discussed revealed 15 chairs. Id. Thus when Mr. Harter re-
sponded that most conference tables were of similar proportions and could hold 15
people comfortably, his choice of 15 participants was accepted. Id.
117. See Harter, supra note 38, at 1405; Harter, supra note 42, at 479; Harter
Interview, supra note 71; Harter Speech, supra note 116. For a discussion of the 15
party limit which Harter proposed, see note 42 and accompanying text supra.
118. Harter's limit of 15 participants is not too low per se. There may be situa-
tions when all of the interests can be represented by fewer than 15 participants. See
Harter, supra note 38, at 1409 n.75 (benzene negotiation had 8 participants). The
intent of this suggested modification is to demonstrate that the number of partici-
pants should be more flexible. Perhaps a more workable rule of thumb for convenors
would be that they should strive to include all of the groups with "clout," but at the
same time they should remember that discussions with more than 25 or 30 partici-
pants may become unmanageable. For a discussion of the appropriate number of
participants, see notes 42 & 89 and accompanying text supra.
119. For a discussion of how adversarial posturing can be used to enhance a
party's negotiating position, see notes 41 & 86-87 and accompanying text supra.
120. For a discussion of the utility of an adversarial posture at the outset of
negotiation, see note 41 supra.
121. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79.
122. For a discussion of the effect of private meetings between OFCCP officials
and the affected interests, see note 88 and accompanying text supra.
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Harter erred when he failed to include the middle-level agency employees in
his agenda for a rulemaking negotiation. 123 One participant in the OFCCP
negotiations has suggested that participation by the middle-level employees,
who will be charged with the ultimate enforcement of the rule, can lend an
important insight to the feasibility of solutions to the problems being negoti-
ated.1 2 4 Thus, regulatory negotiations will be enhanced by the participation
of senior and middle-level agency officials. Broader participation will result
in negotiated rules which more accurately reflect the agency's policy goals
and are more feasible to implement and enforce.' 2 5 The added benefits
from the participation of middle-level officials will arise from the increased
exposure they have had to the actual situations which are the subject of
regulation. '
26
A natural complement to full representation of the agency in rulemak-
ing negotiations is full representation of all affected interests. Although Mr.
Harter suggested that some financial assistance may be required to ensure
the participation of all interests,' 2 7 it is submitted that a more formal finan-
cial aid system would enhance regulatory negotiations. The OFCCP consul-
tations demonstrated that financial assistance can be rendered without
raising any allegations of impropriety.' 28 In order to ensure honesty and
further the goal of participation, it is suggested that a federal trust fund be
established to provide financial aid to those interests which were chosen to
participate in the negotiation but lacked the funds. 129 In addition, in order
to guarantee impartiality, the trust should be administered by a board of
trustees who are free from political influence.' 30
123. See Goldstein Interview, supra note 80 (rulemaking negotiations should
have middle-level agency employees because they will have ultimate responsibility
for enforcement of the regulations upon promulgation). For a discussion of the ap-
propriate agency representative, see notes 64 & 110 supra.
124. See Goldstein Interview, supra note 80.
125. For a discussion of the benefits from the participation of a broader range of
agency employees, see note 107 supra.
126. Goldstein Interview, supra note 80.
127. Harter, supra note 6, at 56.
128. See Elisburg Interview, supra note 79 (OFCCP provided funds to some par-
ticipants and the financial assistance was never questioned because it was all done
openly).
129. The trust fund should be funded by the federal government. There are no
agencies or other bodies currently in existence which would be appropriate to per-
form the functions which are envisioned for the regulatory trust. Although the
ACUS is an independent agency and has greater familiarity with the administrative
process than any other organization, it too would be an inappropriate conduit for the
funds because making decisions about funding would be beyond the current scope of
ACUS activities. See 1 C.F.R. § 301.2 (1984) (purpose of ACUS is to develop im-
provements in the legal procedures used by agencies).
130. It is submitted that an appropriate board of trustees would be composed of
three trustees. Each trustee would serve a three year term with a maximum of one
term per person. The first board would be appointed with one trustee serving for one
year, another serving for two years, and the third serving a full three year term. The
result would be a board of trustees whose composition is more balanced politically
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Finally, one must recognize that the parties to the negotiations may not
always reach a consensus. It is submitted that the absence of a consensus
should not cause the negotiation to be described as unsuccessful. For in-
stance, although the OFCCP consultations resulted in the promulgation of
regulations without the parties reaching a consensus,13 1 the disagreements
between the parties were nevertheless narrowed. 132 In essence, an under-
standing between the parties that they have narrowed their differences to the
extent possible should be an appropriate agreement in rulemaking negotia-
tions.' 33 The most important benefit from such an understanding would be
that in the absence of complete agreement, the agency would be able to
initiate traditional rulemaking with confidence in its knowledge that the af-
fected interests disagree on only a limited number of issues. 134
VI. CONCLUSION
Mr. Harter's proposal for negotiated rulemaking is a harbinger of the
change that new methods of dispute resolution will bring to administrative
agencies; perhaps it is best expressed as a progression from a "reactive" to a
"proactive" process.' 35 Additionally, the reduced contentiousness in the reg-
ulatory process will ameliorate the current "malaise" caused by the formali-
because of the staggered appointment, and subject to less political pressure because of
the fixed term.
It is further submitted that the political accountability of the board could be
heightened if the board were required to publish its funding grants in the Federal
Regiter.
131. Elisburg Interview, supra note 79.
132. Id.
133. A major stumbling block for the two recent attempts to use Harter's proce-
dures was their inability to achieve a consensus according to Harter's definition.
Harter, supra note 38, at 1407-09. It is submitted that negotiations should be consid-
ered successful when they have narrowed the chasm of differences which had previ-
ously separated the parties. Mr. Harter has speculated that in the absence of a
totally negotiated agreement, the parties to the benzene negotiation, who did not
achieve a consensus, may nevertheless agree when faced with the imminent promul-
gation of a proposed rule by OSHA. Harter Interview, supra note 71. It is further
submitted that even though the parties may never totally agree, any resolution of
differences is bound to enhance the regulatory process.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has recently indicated its willing-
ness to negotiate the rest of proposed rules. See A.L.I.-A.B.A., supra note 75, at 153.
The goal of the EPA's negotiations "will be to reach consensus .... The Administra-
tor [of the EPA] will use any consensus-so long as it is within his statutory authority-
as the basis of the proposed rulemaking." Id (emphasis added). The EPA's willing-
ness to use "any consensus" indicates the pragmatism which should underlie the as-
sessment of a negotiated agreement concerning a proposed rule.
134. If the participants were able to achieve a consensus as defined by Harter,
that would be an optimal result. It is suggested, however, that such a consensus will
be very difficult to achieve in practice. It is further submitted that when an agency
initiates traditional rulemaking after negotiations have occurred, at worst the dis-
tance between the various interests will have been clearly defined, realistically that
distance will have narrowed, and at best the parties will have reached a consensus.
135. Joint Hearings, supra note 27, at 107 (Statement of Kate C. Beardsley, Dep-
uty Director, U.S. Regulatory Council) (improving the lines of communication be-
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zation of the rulemaking process. 3 6 This amelioration will largely result
from the special interests, which had previously clogged the process, seeking
ends beyond their narrow self-interests.' 3
7
Negotiated rulemaking, as proposed by Mr. Harter, is a viable option
which would remedy many of the difficulties inherent in modern rulemak-
ing. The procedural issues which arise in a regulatory negotiation were ac-
curately predicted by Mr. Harter. 138 In addition, most of his suggestions
regarding the negotiation of rules were corroborated by the fairly successful
experience of the OFCCP consultations. In light of the OFCCP experience,
Mr. Harter's proposal is a practicable alternative which agencies should
adopt in rulemaking proceedings which satisfy the conditions outlined
above.
Robert L. Sachs, Jr.
tween interested parties can change the role of participants from "reactive" to
"proactive").
136. For a discussion of the "malaise" caused by the increased formalization of
the administrative process, see notes 20-28 and accompanying text supra.
137. The use of an alternative form of rulemaking which requires participants
to negotiate and pursue a solution which looks beyond their narrow self-interest is
especially timely in light of recent concessions by labor unions which rquired the
subordination of self-interest to the common good. See generally 105 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 56-58 (Aug. 1982) (discussion of 15 corporations which either gained conces-
sions from union employees through bargaining or unilaterally imposed concessions
on nonunion employees in order to deal with adverse economic conditions).
138. For a discussion of Harter's predictions concerning the procedural issues
which would arise in a regulatory negotiation, see notes 34-74 and accompanying
text supra.
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